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Abstract 
Unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories of welfare claim that it is the fulfilment and 
frustration of our actual desires that determines how well our life goes for us. This paper defends this 
theory against a set of arguments that are often taken to reduce it to absurdity. It is sometimes 
claimed that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories are unviable because some of our 
actual desires seem to be an intuitively inadequate, repugnant or bizarre basis for welfare 
determination. In response to this problem, some desire theorists have abandoned the actualist 
theory in favour of an idealisation theory of welfare. Other desire theorists have preserved the 
premise that the fulfilment and frustration of actual desires determines welfare and have augmented 
the theory with a ‘restricted’ desire theory in response to these problematic desires. The desires that 
serve as counterexamples to the claim that actual desires determine welfare have been referred to by 
different names in the literature on this topic. However, I have opted to go for the umbrella terms 
defective desires, Dead Sea apples, and intrinsically quirky desires to categorise the different 
arguments, based on the identification of intuitively inadequate, repugnant or bizarre desires, 
leveraged by critics as undermining the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. This 
paper claims that upon inspection none of these desires need undermine the unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theory. Therefore, while there may be reasons to adopt an idealisation over an 
actualist account, or a restricted over an unrestricted account, these reasons are not to be found in 
the counterexamples presented by defective desires, Dead Sea apples, and intrinsically quirky desires. 
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Introduction 
 
Unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories of welfare claim that it is the fulfilment and 
frustration of our actual desires that determines how well our life goes for us. According to this view, 
desire fulfilments are the only source of non-instrumental welfare generation, and desire frustrations 
are the only source of non-instrumental welfare detraction1. This paper defends the claim that 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories are not undermined by examples of desire 
fulfilments and frustrations that seem intuitively absurd, repugnant or bizarre to accept determine 
welfare. The examples that I survey fall into the categories of: ‘defective desires’, ‘Dead Sea apples’ 
and ‘intrinsically quirky desires’. Defective desires are those desires where fulfilment intuitively seems 
to effect welfare negatively rather than positively. Dead Sea apples are those desires where fulfilment 
seems completely devoid of any positive welfare enhancement whatsoever. And intrinsically quirky 
desires are those desires where it seems counterintuitive to claim that fulfilment effects welfare 
positively due to certain intrinsic features present in these desires. There is some overlap between 
these categories. For example, Dead Sea apples and intrinsically quirky desires can be subsets of 
defective desires if they lead to negative welfare generation. Nevertheless, despite this overlap, I have 
found this tripartite distinction to be useful primarily because it serves as a way of framing the 
different solutions that are required to explain the problems posed by each of these different sets of 
desire fulfilments. It should be noted from the outset that there is no guarantee that idealisation or 
restricted desire theories can convincingly solve the problems posed by this collection of problematic 
desires. Rather, my claim is that if idealisation or restricted desire theories are motivated by a need to 
account for these counter-intuitive desire fulfilments, then this motivation is unnecessary because 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories have the available resources to explain these 
desire fulfilments convincingly. My thesis is divided into four separate chapters, which are preceded 
and followed by an introduction and conclusion. 
My first chapter outlines some of the basic concepts and terminology used in discussions of 
philosophy of welfare. I begin by first considering what we mean when we discuss a person’s welfare, 
and the sorts of arguments that writers have used to defend their preferred conceptions of welfare 
over rival candidates. I then outline the features of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories, and some of the considerations that often motivate their adoption. The purpose of this 
discussion is not to show conclusively that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories are 
obviously correct or more representative of our pre-theoretical intuitions about welfare than rival 
theories. Rather, I use this chapter to frame the discussion that follows, so that it is clear what 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories are, and why some people find that these 
theories appeal to their intuitions. 
My second chapter considers the problem of defective desires. More specifically, it examines 
how unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories can handle cases of ill-informed and 
irrational desire fulfilments that seem to lead to consequences that detract from welfare rather than 
                                                          
1 I have opted to use the term ‘non-instrumental’ value rather than ‘intrinsic’ value. This is because the term 
intrinsic suggests that valuable phenomena contain their value independently of their relationships to other 
phenomena. Conversely, the term non-instrumental allows for the possibility that things of value derive their 
value partly from the relationships they have with other things. In Carson’s words, ‘There is no reason to think 
that everything that has non-causal or non-instrumental value possesses value in isolation, and there is no 
reason to think that things that possess value in isolation always possess non-causal value when they occur as 
parts of broader states of affairs’ (Carson, 2000: 156). Writers on welfare tend to use intrinsic and non-
instrumental interchangeably, so I have opted to regularise terminology to non-instrumental. 
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enhance it. I begin by outlining the problem of defective desires and the general form of restricted 
and idealisation accounts that have been given in response to it. The chapter then argues that the 
problem of defective desires can be answered without recourse to idealisation or restricted desire 
theories by claiming that ill-informed and irrational desire fulfilments can be explained as being all-
things-considered bad for welfare, rather than completely devoid of welfare. The all-things-
considered bad for welfare argument claims that these examples show that welfare is decreased 
overall by a desire’s fulfilment, but that these desire fulfilments nevertheless contain some 
compensatory welfare generation so as not to undermine the premise of unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theories that every instance of desire fulfilment non-instrumentally enhances 
welfare. 
Chapter Three considers cases of Dead Sea apples. These are the types of desire fulfilment 
that intuitively appear to be completely devoid of any positive welfare generation whatsoever. 
Consequently, Dead Sea apples cannot be explained by the all-things-considered bad for welfare 
argument. I consider the response offered by Chris Heathwood that we can answer the problem of 
Dead Sea apples by adopting the ‘concurrence view’ of welfare. The concurrence view claims that we 
must be desiring a state of affairs at the same time as that state of affairs occurs in order for any 
welfare to be generated by a desire fulfilment. Consequently, Heathwood claims that Dead Sea apples 
do not exist because the examples given of them fail to describe instances of actual desire fulfilments. 
While the concurrence view does solve the problem of Dead Sea apples, I argue that adopting it entails 
assenting to a whole host of other theoretical commitments that we may have reasons to want to 
avoid. Instead, I propose that the problem of Dead Sea apples can be ameliorated by adopting a 
‘composite desire theory’. This theory claims that examples of Dead Sea apples often fail to describe 
instances of actual desire fulfilments because typically actual desires specify several clauses as 
prerequisites for fulfilment. I argue that examples of Dead Sea apples seem intuitive because often 
they appeal to the fulfilment of singular clauses of composite desires. In these cases, we mistakenly 
believe that a desire has been fulfilled when instead only a singular clause of a composite desire has 
been fulfilled. I argue that if we adopt this understanding of typical actual desires, then we can explain 
many examples of Dead Sea apples as simply failing to describe actual desire fulfilments. Moreover, I 
claim that those examples of Dead Sea apples that do describe actual instances of desire fulfilment 
can be unproblematically explained by unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. I do 
this by pointing out that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories do not require 
subjective feelings of desire satisfaction or pleasure to be generated in every instance of welfare 
enhancement. Consequently, to explain some examples of seemingly Dead Sea apple desire 
fulfilments we can make the claim that some welfare is non-instrumentally generated even in the 
absence of subjective satisfaction. Therefore, we ought not be troubled by the claim that some 
experiences that we may intuitively call Dead Sea apples nevertheless do contribute to our welfare. 
Chapter Four considers the problem presented by intrinsically quirky desires. Specifically, I 
consider the issues presented by base desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, and 
artificially aroused desires. All these desires have all been said to contain intrinsic features that 
disqualify their fulfilment from effecting welfare positively. The examples that I have grouped together 
under this category are all desires that seem to be deeply held by individuals. Moreover, the fulfilment 
of many of these types of desires often generates subjective mental states of pleasure or desire 
satisfaction. Nevertheless, critics point towards intrinsic features of these desires that seem to 
undermine the claim that they enhance welfare when fulfilled. I examine some of the responses given 
to alleviate these concerns, and claim that we have good reasons to think that none of these desires 
contain intrinsic features that undermine the claim that their fulfilment non-instrumentally enhances 
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welfare. This chapter is considerably shorter than the preceding two, as the problems posed by these 
desires have already been thoroughly examined by the literature. 
 Overall, this thesis seeks to show that many of those desires often said to undermine the 
viability of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories fail to do so. The thesis does not 
claim that there are no good reasons to adopt an idealisation or restricted non-mental state desire 
theory. It simply claims that the ability to solve the problems of defective desires, Dead Sea apples, 
and intrinsically quirky desires is not a reason to opt for these theories over unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theories.  
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Chapter 1: Welfare and desire theories 
 
Introduction 
Philosophy of welfare considers the question of what makes a life go non-instrumentally well for the 
person living it. The term welfare is widely used to capture the value that tracks the feature(s) that 
determine how non-instrumentally well a life goes for the person living it (Feldman, 2004: 9)2. 
Moreover, it also makes sense to speak of a person’s welfare at certain points of their life, and the 
welfare effects of certain individualised events (Dorsey, 2013: 152). Philosophy of welfare seeks to 
distil this concept down to its most basic features to explain how and to what degree events affect a 
person’s welfare. In Mark Lukas’ words, ‘the main task of giving an account of well-being comes down 
to specifying how we ought to assign values to a life and its parts’ (Lukas, 2010: 3). When considering 
welfare, it is important to note that welfare theories in and of themselves do not make claims about 
how welfare should be integrated into our wider normative framework. There are multiple values that 
we care about and which are often taken to have normative significance when assessing the merits of 
someone’s life and welfare is simply one among these (Feldman, 2004: 8; Griffin, 1986: 23; Sumner, 
1996: 20). Some of these values may be in opposition to each other; for example, it may be possible 
for a person to live a profoundly unethical life while maintaining high welfare (Lukas, 2010: 2). Indeed, 
we do intuitively seem to face choices between actions that enhance our welfare, and actions that 
contribute to living a more ethical life. The decisions we make about how much of our income we will 
give to charity, and how much we spend on things we desire for ourselves may be one such choice. 
Moreover, some of these values may be interrelated. It may be, as Simon Keller claims, that the ethical 
value of our life non-instrumentally contributes to the welfare value of our life (Keller, 2004: 31). 
Aristotle, on some readings of him at least, seems to go further than Keller by claiming that welfare 
and ethical values are essentially reducible to one another. On this interpretation of Aristotle, the 
correct prudential choice of action is also always the correct ethical choice of action (Barnes & Kenny, 
2004: 1097b13-17; Sumner, 1996: 79)3. Therefore, on this account, the value that we assign to the 
welfare of a person’s life always correlates with the ethical value that we assign to that person’s life. 
Nevertheless, despite the plurality of values that can be used to assess someone’s life, and despite the 
possible interrelatedness of some of these values, it seems to make sense that one of those values is 
to do with how well a person’s life is going for them. It is certainly a concept that exists within our pre-
theoretical intuitions and is widely employed by us to assess and guide actions. Therefore, an 
investigation into the principles that determine what non-instrumentally effects welfare seems 
warranted. 
 
Rival candidate theories of welfare 
A plethora of different theories have been proposed as candidates to track the welfare value of lives. 
Notably, Parfit makes a tripartite distinction between hedonistic theories, desire theories and 
objective list theories (Parfit, 1984: 493). Hedonistic theories claim that only pleasure non-
                                                          
2 Sometimes the term ‘wellbeing’ is used synonymously with welfare in the literature. I have opted to 
regularise my terminology to welfare primarily because that is the term that the more recent literature has 
coalesced around. Moreover, for me, the term wellbeing carries connotations of subjective mental states in 
way that the term welfare does not. If wellbeing does carry these connotations, then we should avoid it for it 
seems to subtly prejudge the question of whether welfare/wellbeing is a mental state or not.  
3 I use the term prudential to mean what self-interest dictates. The concept of self-interest tracks a person’s 
own welfare. 
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instrumentally enhances a person’s welfare and that only pain non-instrumentally detracts from their 
welfare. Desire theories claim that it is only the fulfilment of desires that non-instrumentally enhances 
a person’s welfare and only the frustration of desires that non-instrumentally detracts from their 
welfare4. Objective list theories claim that it is only the attainment of certain things on a specified list 
that non-instrumentally enhances a person’s welfare and only the absence of those things on the list 
that non-instrumentally detracts from their welfare. For example, an Aristotelean account would 
qualify as an objective list theory on this schema, for it specifies a list of virtues, the possession of 
which are components of a person’s welfare (Barnes & Kenny, 2004: 1098a13-16). Parfit’s tripartite 
distinction is not a descriptively comprehensive methodology for distinguishing between the different 
welfare theories on offer. Firstly, it assigns a whole host of vastly different welfare theories to a single 
residual category of ‘objective list’ theories (Woodard, 2013: 790). More importantly, from the 
perspective of this paper, it fails track some crucial differences between welfare theories, such as 
whether a theory is a ‘mental state’ or a ‘non-mental state’ theory (Woodard, 2013: 792). However, 
for the purposes of this discussion, further elaboration of the distinctions and divisions between 
different welfare theories is unnecessary. It is enough to acknowledge that there is a polyphony of 
different theories vying to be candidates for welfare. Consequently, it appears that we need some way 
of evaluating the relative strength of rival welfare theories. 
There is no consensus on how we ought to assess the criteria that ought to be used for welfare 
theory evaluation. Indeed, there is little systematic engagement in the literature on what criteria 
ought to be used to assess the plausibility of rival welfare theories. Plausible appeals to intuition 
abound and claims that theories ought to meet one requirement or another are plentiful. Yet there is 
a distinct lack of attempts to systematise a criterion for welfare theory evaluation. Such an attempt 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, an examination of some of the motivations 
that guide people to adopt one theory over its rivals is useful to understand why some desire theories 
do appeal to many people, and why unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories may be 
better placed than rivals to meet some of these motivations. There are several standards that have 
emerged within the literature that seek to make comparisons about the relative strength of differing 
welfare theories. I will briefly survey four standards that may affect whether we are or ought to be 
inclined to adopt one theory over its rivals. These are: extensional adequacy, normative adequacy, 
descriptive adequacy, and conceptual frugality. By no means is this list intended to be exhaustive, and 
I make no claims about the relative weight that ought to be assigned to each of these metrics of 
evaluating the viability of rival welfare theories. I simply offer them as a way of understanding and 
categorising some of the arguments that are often appealed to in order to support one theory over 
another. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to claim that unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theories fare better on these metrics than rival theories. This thesis does not seek to 
show that this theory is the correct theory of welfare, or even that there is such a thing as a correct 
theory of welfare. Indeed, we need not be normative realists about welfare in order to find value in 
establishing shared conceptual understandings about what welfare could be, or to find value in 
systematising our own intuitions about welfare. Therefore, it is worth briefly outlining why some 
people hold the view that it is the fulfilment and frustrations of desires that determine a person’s 
welfare, and why the unrestricted, actualist and non-mental state versions of the desire theory may 
                                                          
4 The exception to this definition is antifrustrationism, which claims that the fulfilment of desires does not non-
instrumentally enhance welfare. Instead, on this view, desire fulfilment simply alleviates the non-instrumental 
disvalue that comes from desire frustration and anticipation (Fehige, 1998: 508). If we classify 
antifrustrationism as a desire theory, then we must drop the requirement that desire fulfilments non-
instrumentally contribute to a person’s welfare. For simplicity’s sake I shall refer to desire theories as if 
fulfilments do non-instrumentally contribute to welfare and set aside the case of antifrustrationism. 
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contain features that fare well on these metrics. This discussion is intended to show that unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theories fare well on some of these standards of evaluation, which 
in turn may therefore generate reasons to adopt this type of theory. Chapters Two, Three and Four 
are all concerned with preserving the extensional adequacy of these theories, as the criticisms from 
defective desires, Dead Sea apples, and intrinsically quirky desires all appeal to intuitions that may 
undermine their extensional adequacy. 
One approach to evaluating welfare theories is to assess their extensional adequacy. The 
extensional adequacy of a theory is determined by whether it produces conclusions that align 
satisfactorily with our pre-theoretical intuitions about what outcomes we expect a theory of welfare 
to label as non-instrumentally welfare enhancing and what outcomes we expect a theory of welfare 
to label as non-instrumentally welfare detracting. A theory of welfare is extensionally adequate when 
its judgements about the types of things that effect welfare generally align with our pre-theoretical 
intuitions, or at least do not clash with them severely enough to undermine the theory (Enoch, 2005: 
766). That is not to say that we should not be prepared for surprises: it may be that some things that 
we pre-theoretically intuitively believe to be beneficial to welfare instead turn out to have negative 
consequences for welfare. However, in general, we may expect stronger candidate welfare theories 
to more-or-less align with most of the evaluative judgements made by our pre-theoretical intuitions. 
The term extensional inadequacy captures the idea that the implications of a theory can be so 
intuitively inadequate, repugnant or bizarre as to undermine the viability of the theory itself. As such, 
extensional inadequacy is a threshold concept, for it requires that a certain threshold of intuitive 
implausibility is identified in the conclusions of a theory before the theory is dismissed for being 
extensionally inadequate. Conversely, the term extensional adequacy describes a phenomenon that 
comes in degrees. A theory can be more or less extensionally adequate depending upon the extent to 
which its conclusions cohere with our pre-theoretical intuitions. Some writers have suggested that 
finding a welfare theory that aligns closely with the bulk of our pre-theoretical intuitions about what 
types of things determine welfare ought to be a large consideration when considering the viability of 
a welfare theory (Fehige & Wessels, 1998: xxviii). Regardless of the relative weight we assign 
extensional adequacy in our criteria for assessing welfare theories, it strikes me as intuitively plausible 
that it ought to play some role in evaluating rival theories. Many writers who argue against different 
theories of welfare do so from the standpoint of finding extensionally inadequate conclusions entailed 
by it. Moreover, many defences of welfare theories involve attempts to defend their extensional 
adequacy. This paper continues in that tradition and is primarily concerned with rebuking the claims 
that examples of defective desires, Dead Sea apples, and intrinsically quirky desires undermine the 
extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories.  
L. W. Sumner outlines a further two ways of assessing rival theories of welfare (Sumner, 1996: 
8). The first is to do with the normative adequacy of a theory. Normative adequacy is determined by 
what extent the welfare theory under consideration fits into our wider normative framework of 
values. An example of a concern about the normative adequacy of a welfare theory may be that it is 
expected to generate relatively intuitive assessments when combined with our ethical theory. If a 
welfare theory generates profoundly counterintuitive implications when combined with our ethical 
theory, and we are willing to accept that ethical theory has priority over or precedes welfare theory, 
then we may find that our welfare theory is normatively inadequate and in need of revision. Concerns 
about normative adequacy pick up on the observation that welfare theories have implications beyond 
simply generating prudential considerations, and the intuition that the effects that these theories have 
on other normative judgements ought to be considered when assessing their viability. However, 
Sumner correctly points out that this approach by itself is not enough – for there may be several 
welfare theories that cohere equally well with our wider normative framework, and some of those 
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theories are likely to be deeply intuitively implausible. Therefore, a second method of adjudication, 
descriptive adequacy, ought to play at least some role in the determination of the viability of different 
welfare theories (Sumner, 1996: 10).  
Descriptive adequacy is based on the extent to which a welfare theory captures our pre-
theoretical intuitions about what principles ought to determine welfare. A theory lacking in descriptive 
adequacy is likely to be extensionally inadequate, although the two concepts are subtly different. 
Descriptive adequacy examines whether the principles of a welfare theory cohere adequately with 
our pre-theoretical intuitions about what sorts of principles ought to determine welfare; extensional 
adequacy is to do with whether the implications of a theory align sufficiently with our pre-theoretical 
intuitions about what sorts of implications a theory ought to label as affecting welfare. A common 
procedural method evoked to identify and defend a welfare theory involves appealing to the process 
of reflective equilibrium (Feldman, 2004: 206). This process involves oscillating between adapting pre-
theoretical principles about welfare and pre-theoretical beliefs about the sorts of things that are taken 
to determine welfare until a point is reached when principles and beliefs are aligned. One way of 
understanding reflective equilibrium is to claim that it involves an appeal to both the descriptive and 
extensional adequacy of a theory in order to generate a welfare criterion. A fourth way of assessing 
the viability of theories of welfare is to analyse their conceptual frugality. A theory of welfare may be 
superior to its rivals if it utilises a less complex set of interrelated principles to generate conclusions 
about the welfare effects of events. This is simply because by utilising fewer principles, there are fewer 
components that an objector can find fault with. Properly speaking, conceptual frugality is a 
component of descriptive adequacy for many people. However, it is worth mentioning this criterion 
separately, as it is one that many people appeal to when assessing a welfare theory’s descriptive 
adequacy. I have outlined these conceptual approaches to evaluating the merits of welfare theories 
at the start of this thesis as often these considerations are referred to in the discussion that follows. 
 We can briefly apply some of these evaluative metrics to desire theories to outline why some 
people find these theories convincing. Desire theories claim that it is the fulfilment and frustration of 
our desires that are the sole determinants of welfare. John Stuart Mill claimed that, upon inspection, 
all our desires appear to aim at the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, whether that be for 
ourselves or for other people (Mill, 1993: 39). This led him to adopt a hedonistic theory of welfare. 
Hedonistic welfare theories claim that pleasure and pain are the sole features that determine welfare. 
If Mill is correct, then hedonism may be a descriptively and extensionally adequate theory of welfare, 
as through introspection people may be able to assent to his position that analysis of the aims of our 
desires supports hedonism. Mill’s position can be interpreted as defending the descriptive adequacy 
of hedonism through appeal to claims about desires and their aims. This argument places the role of 
desires as lending credibility and structural support for his argument for hedonism. In this way, the 
intuition that desires play a role in welfare provides a measure of descriptive adequacy for hedonism. 
Mill appears to be drawing support from the philosophical position of what has become known as 
internalism. Internalism about welfare claims that, ‘something cannot be good for a particular 
individual unless it can motivate her’ (Rosati, 1996: 300). The idea that the things that are good for 
our welfare must somehow be related to our desires, or a subset of them, has widespread pre-
theoretical appeal across many writers. Hedonistic theories of welfare meet the criterion of 
internalism, as we are often motivated by pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Mill’s argument appeals 
to this intuition that a descriptively adequate welfare theory must adhere to internalism, and makes 
the additional claim that hedonism is the only theory that can meet this because all desires point 
towards hedonistic concerns anyway. Yet, as Richard Brandt points out, ‘Mill was not even remotely 
correct when he said that ‘desiring a thing and finding it pleasant’ are ‘two modes of naming the same 
psychological fact’. He would have been closer had he said that desiring a thing and its conception 
Atus Mariqueo-Russell  Birkbeck, University of London 
10 
 
being motivating are the same thing’ (Brandt, 1979: 43). Indeed, the counterexamples to Mill’s 
position are replete. For a start, Carson points out that there seem to be people who seek their own 
suffering (Carson, 2000: 19). More generally, it seems obvious to state that people desire all sorts of 
things for all sorts of different reasons – some of which do not point towards the pursuit of pleasure 
and the avoidance of pain (Griffin, 1986: 9). 
It seems difficult to extrapolate any singular feature behind the aims of all our desires, except 
perhaps one: the fact that all desires aim at fulfilment. Therefore, if we are to draw reasons for 
preferring one welfare theory to its rivals from the contents of our desires, then a good place to start 
may be with the observation that all desires, across all persons, aim at fulfilment and the avoidance 
of frustration. From this observation, it appears that Mill’s appeal to the underlying aims of desires is 
more supportive of a desire theory than a hedonistic theory. While both hedonism and desire theories 
abide by internalism, desire theories seem better placed than hedonism to capitalise on internalism, 
as they claim that it is desires, rather than one of their numerous aims, that determine welfare. 
Moreover, desire theories in their basic forms are as conceptually frugal as hedonism in their reliance 
upon only two principles to find fault with. The simplicity of desire theories can be considered a virtue. 
This is especially so of non-mental state, unrestricted and actualist desire accounts, which do not 
include caveats restricting which types of desires determine welfare. Consequently, we have reasons 
for thinking that desire theories may fare well on descriptive adequacy and conceptual frugality scales 
of assessment. Finally, Sumner has pointed to the normative adequacy of desire theories in sitting well 
with the dominant political philosophy of liberalism (Sumner, 1996: 123). Desire theories have 
similarities with liberalism as a political philosophy because they enable people to shape their own 
conditions for welfare generation in a way that rival theories do not always do. None of these reasons 
may be sufficient to accept the claim that it is the fulfilment and frustration of desires that determines 
welfare. Nevertheless, between them, these considerations provide a brief survey some of the 
concerns motivating the adoption of desire theories. 
 
The basic unit of welfare: Mental state and non-mental state desire theories 
Desire theories claim that it is the fulfilment and frustration of desires that are the sole non-
instrumental determinants of a person’s welfare5. The basic unit of welfare for the desire theory 
emerges from the relationship between desires for states of affairs to obtain, and, depending on the 
type of account, either our subjective perceptions about whether those states of affairs have 
obtained, or, alternatively the objective fact of whether those states of affairs have obtained6. 
According to non-mental state desire theories, welfare is determined by the relationship between a 
person’s desires and the objective state of the world. If the objective state of the world aligns with the 
state of affairs desired, then welfare is affected positively; and if the desire is misaligned with the 
objective state of the world, then welfare is affected negatively. In Mark Lukas’ words, non-mental 
state desire theories claim that, ‘the basic building blocks of well-being are states of affairs that 
supervene in part on mental states (desires) and in part on the state of the world (objects of desire)’ 
(Lukas, 2010: 4). Consequently, non-mental state desire theories are labelled ‘non-mental state’ 
theories because while they do typically require the presence of a mental state to be a component of 
                                                          
5 These accounts are sometimes called desire-satisfactionist accounts. 
6 The term ‘state of affairs’ is being employed here in a broad manner that can cover desires for other mental 
states, objective states of the world, or phenomenological experiences. 
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welfare generation, it is not solely mental state components that determine welfare7. To label a theory 
a non-mental state theory requires that welfare is determined, at least in part, by components that 
are not mental states. The distinction between non-mental state and mental state desire theories of 
welfare is based upon the different role that the state of the world plays in these two theories8.  
According to mental state desire theories, welfare is produced by the relationship between a 
person’s dispositional state of desiring and the subjective perception that they experience about 
whether their desire has been fulfilled. The positive welfare component is termed subjective desire 
satisfaction and is produced by possession of a subjective perception that a desire has been met 
(Heathwood, 2006: 548). Whereas the negative welfare component, subjective desire frustration, 
emerges when the subjective perception that a desire has not been met is present. Mental state desire 
theories conform to what Griffin labels ‘The Experience Requirement’. This requirement stipulates 
that we must in some way be aware of the satisfaction/frustration of our desires in order for them to 
affect our welfare (Griffin, 1986: 13). Many people’s intuitions claim that The Experience Requirement 
is necessary for descriptive adequacy. Their intuitions do not point to anything outside of mental 
states that could determine welfare and are untroubled by the problems, such as the experience 
machine, that will be examined shortly. However, for other people, The Experience Requirement is 
adopted largely in response to problems of extensional inadequacy that non-mental state theories 
seem to face. The later chapters of this paper seek to show ways of avoiding these extensionally 
inadequate conclusions without the abandonment of the non-mental state desire theory. 
While the mental state desire theory conforms with The Experience Requirement. The non-
mental state desire theory is a type of ‘correspondence theory’. Correspondence theories claim that, 
‘how well things go for a person is determined by (i) the person’s attitudes towards states of affairs or 
propositions (desiring them, believing them, taking pleasure in them), and (ii) whether those states of 
affairs are true’ (Bradley, 2007: 47). Part of the attraction of correspondence theories is that they are 
able to discount pleasures or subjective desire satisfactions generated from false beliefs in a way that 
most mental state theories lack the resources to do9. This allows for correspondence theories to claim 
                                                          
7 I say typically here because according to some idealisation non-mental state accounts of welfare, we need 
not actually hold a mental state of desire in order for our welfare to be affected by objective properties of the 
world. All that is required is that we would hold the desire under some specified set of ideal circumstances. 
8 These theories fit into the broader categories of being state-of-mind theories and state-of-the-world theories 
respectively. State-of-mind theories claim that welfare is determined solely by mental states. State-of-the-
world theories claim that welfare is determined at least partly by objective properties of the world (Sumner, 
1996: 82). 
9 A counterexample of a self-described mental state theory that does attempt to do this is Fred Feldman’s 
‘veridical intrinsic attitudinal hedonism’, which is itself a correspondence theory (Feldman, 2002: 616). 
Veridical intrinsic attitudinal hedonism claims that in order for pleasure to lead to welfare it must be based 
upon true beliefs. Feldman claims that this is a mental state theory because every instance of welfare 
generation is dependent upon the mental state of pleasure; it just that every mental state of pleasure by itself 
does not guarantee welfare generation. Wendy Donner has made a similar argument in her book The Liberal 
Self (1991), where she argues that the genesis of pleasures can contribute to their welfare value (Donner, 
1991: 71). Where Donner and Feldman’s veridical theories differ from typical hedonistic theories is that every 
mental state of pleasure by itself does not cause welfare generation. It is contestable about whether such 
theories qualify as forms of mental state hedonism or not. According to Carson, one of the four features of 
hedonistic theories of value is that, ‘all pleasant experiences are non-instrumentally good’ (Carson, 2000: 12). 
In this way, Carson’s formulation does not allow for hedonists to base welfare upon state of the world 
considerations such as whether the pleasure is based upon true belief. The issues of whether Feldman and 
Donner’s theories qualify as mental state theories, and whether correspondence theories can ever be mental 
state theories, I shall set aside. I set these issues aside because Feldman and Donner’s theories only allow for 
the first benefit of correspondence theories, which is that they enable us to discount welfare based upon false 
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that cases of radical deception or misperception do have deleterious effects upon welfare. A prime 
example of the type of experience that we may want to discount as not enhancing welfare is illustrated 
by Robert Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ thought experiment. In this scenario, Nozick asks us to 
envisage a life in which, unbeknownst to us, all our experiences, including our interpersonal 
relationships, are simulated by a machine that ensures that our life is pleasurable one (Nozick, 1974: 
42-3). Such a simulated life is likely to rank high in welfare on mental state theories of welfare, for the 
machine is designed to produce positive mental states10. Yet despite this, many people hold strong 
intuitions that such a life would not involve as much welfare as had those experiences been authentic 
and not simulated. Correspondence theories are able to track intuitions that the authenticity of 
experiences affects the welfare generated them by claiming that, in cases such as Nozick’s experience 
machine, our desires for authentic experiences and interpersonal relationships are not actually being 
fulfilled and therefore positive welfare is not being generated. Griffin captures this intuition in support 
of correspondence theories in the following way:  
‘My truly having close and authentic personal relations is not the kind of thing that can enter 
my experience; all that can enter is what is common to both my truly having such relations and 
my merely believing that I do. And this seems to distort the nature of these values. If I want to 
accomplish something with my life, it is not that I want to have a sense of accomplishment’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 19). 
Another attraction of correspondence theories is that they can claim that desires that we 
hold for states of affairs to be fulfilled do generate welfare, even in cases where their fulfilment or 
frustration does not generate any mental states. For example, we may care deeply that the 
Cambridge botanical gardens are preserved throughout our lifetime and think that their 
preservation affects our welfare irrespectively of whether we come to gain beliefs about whether 
they have been preserved. We can imagine a scenario where we are permanently cut off from 
knowledge about whether the botanical gardens have been preserved, and yet still maintain a 
strong desire that they are preserved. Correspondence theories can allow for the outcome of the 
botanical gardens’ fate to affect our welfare irrespective of the beliefs that we gain about their 
fate. Consequently, according to correspondence theories, whether the gardens are preserved or 
destroyed can indeed affect our welfare even in the absence of us gaining beliefs about whether 
our desire has been fulfilled or frustrated. At least in some cases, people do seem to value the 
objective state of the world itself as being a component of their welfare, and not simply the beliefs 
that they have about the state of the world. In Griffin’s words, ‘we do seem to desire things other 
than states of mind, even independently of the states of mind they produce’ (Griffin, 1986: 9). 
Therefore, correspondence theories have two distinct advantages over most mental state theories: 
they are able to discount welfare generated through deception or misperception, while also being 
able to claim that welfare is be generated by desires that we hold where fulfilment or frustration 
does not affect mental states. The drawbacks of correspondence theories come in the form of a 
unique set of challenges that they face in meeting the criteria of extensional adequacy. The 
question of how we achieve this is explored throughout the rest of this thesis. 
                                                          
beliefs and pleasures. These theories do not have the resources available to enable the second benefit of that 
correspondence theories, which is discussed below. 
10 While Nozick’s example involves the machine simulating pleasurable experiences, his example of pleasure is 
substitutable for any other mental state that we may want to value, and the thought experiment will illustrate 
the same limitations to that theory as it does with one based on pleasure. With the exception of Feldman and 
Donner’s veridical theories, if we take these positions to be mental state theories, then these are issues 
replicable across all mental state theories, including mental state desire theories. 
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Before continuing, it is useful to first briefly outline what desire is, and what constitutes a 
desire fulfilment. James Griffin describes the phenomenon of desire fulfilment as emerging from the 
following conditions: ‘A desire is ‘fulfilled’ in the sense in which a clause in a contract is fulfilled: 
namely, what was agreed (desired) comes about’ (Griffin, 1986: 14). This definition allows for desires 
to specify intricate details that can only be realised under a very narrow set of conditions, such as 
meeting Atticus at the Cambridge botanical gardens at 5:30pm on Tuesday; while also allowing for 
desires to be constructed as broad and realisable under a wide set of diverse circumstances, such as 
the desire for pleasurable phenomenological experiences generally. In this way, the contract analogy 
can account for the different types of desires that we experience. In addition to the contact analogy, 
we can also state that, ‘desires are propositional attitudes’ (Heathwood, 2005: 489). On this 
description, desires are mental states that make descriptive claims about states of affairs and involve 
a disposition in favour of or against those states of affairs occurring. They are fulfilled when those 
states of affairs are objectively brought about and frustrated when those states of affairs fail to be 
objectively brought about. According to desire theories, the amount of welfare generated from a 
fulfilled desire tracks the intensity of the desire felt – so that those desires that are experienced more 
strongly generate more welfare when fulfilled. Moreover, those desires experienced more intensely 
also contribute more negative welfare when frustrated than less intense desires. 
 
Conclusion 
The theory that I am interested in is the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory of 
welfare. This chapter has set the scene for why someone may hold such a theory. Before I consider 
the problem of defective desires, it is first worth briefly explaining the ‘actualist’ and ‘unrestricted’ 
parts of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. The theory is actualist if it claims 
that it is the fulfilment of actual desires that determine welfare. And the theory is unrestricted if it 
claims that the fulfilment of all types of desires count towards determining welfare. In Mark Lukas’ 
words, the unrestricted theory, ‘places no restrictions on which desires are relevant to well-being. It 
says that all desire satisfactions are good for us and all frustrations are bad, no matter what the 
relevant desires happen to be about’ (Lukas, 2010: 4). The alternatives to these positions are 
idealisation and restricted desire theories. I will examine what these positions are and why someone 
may hold these positions in the following chapter. My thesis is not that idealisation or restricted desire 
theories are incorrect or unviable in general, rather it simply claims that one need not adopt these 
positions in response to the problems of defective desires, Dead Sea apples or intrinsically quirky 
desires. 
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Chapter 2: The problem of defective desires 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I consider the problem of defective desires that has been raised against unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theories. Defective desires, alongside other types of desires deemed 
problematic for the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories, 
have motivated many writers to adopt idealisation or restricted desire accounts. Arguments that claim 
that there are desire fulfilments that appear not to enhance welfare seek to undermine the 
extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. These arguments 
claim that the implications of these theories are so intuitively inadequate, repugnant or bizarre that 
we ought to reject the theories outright. The identification of these sorts of desires has led writers to 
the conclusion that, ‘some of our [actual] responses are clearly bad, not reason supported, or not in 
accord with what really is of value, or with what is really good for us. Idealization is called for in order 
to save even just a possibility of extensional adequacy for response-dependence views’ (Enoch, 2006: 
766). The concerns about problematic desires that are most prominently voiced against unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theories fall under the rubric of arguments from ‘defective desires’ 
(Heathwood, 2005), ‘Dead Sea apples’ (Lauinger, 2016), and intrinsically ‘quirky desires’ (Bruckner, 
2016). My later chapters examine Dead Sea apples and intrinsically quirky desires. This chapter is 
concerned with examining defective desires, as well as providing an outline of how restricted and 
idealisation accounts have been used to respond to them. I argue that defective desires need not 
undermine the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories 
because Chris Heathwood’s ‘all-things-considered bad for welfare’ argument can account for them 
without appeal to idealisation or restriction.  
 
Three possible responses to the problem of defective desires 
Many writers have argued that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories are not viable 
because of the existence of, what has been termed in the literature, ‘defective desires’11. The problem 
of defective desires is said to undermine the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theories and thereby rule them out as viable candidates for occupying the welfare 
criterion. Desires can be defective for a number of reasons, but all defective desires pose the same 
basic problem for non-mental state actualist desire theories, which is presented by Heathwood as 
arising from the fact that, ‘sometimes, it is bad for a person to get what he wants’ (Heathwood, 2005: 
487). Posed as a question for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories, Heathwood’s 
observation is that: if desire fulfilment is what non-instrumentally enhances welfare, then how do we 
account for instances of desire fulfilment that are in fact detrimental to welfare? It is worth refining 
this problem provisionally to more precisely capture our intuitions about what conditions make a 
                                                          
11 While this problem has been levelled against unrestricted non-mental state idealisation desire theories as 
well, the problem of defective desires is more threatening to unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories. Indeed, as has been noted, idealisation is often evoked as a response the problem of defective 
desires because such accounts are said to have more available resources at their disposal to answer it. Because 
of this, and because the central argument of this thesis is to outline and defend unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theories, I shall focus my attention on defending the actualist position from the argument from 
defective desires. However, it is worth noting that idealisation in and of itself does not necessarily solve the 
problem of defective desires. As Bruckner puts it, ‘It is not clear that such [defective] desires would not also 
survive exposure to the facts and unerring reasoning’ (Bruckner, 2016: 12). 
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desire defective. I propose the following: defective desires are those desires for things that are bad for 
a person’s welfare when fulfilled, but which are nevertheless taken by the unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theory to non-instrumentally enhance a person’s welfare if fulfilled12. If defective 
desires exist, then on face value they pose a challenge to unrestricted non-mental state actualist 
desire theories. This is because, according to unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories, 
welfare is non-instrumentally enhanced through the fulfilment of our actual desires – yet, according 
to the defective desire problem, some desires are bad for a person’s welfare when fulfilled. Griffin 
forcefully summarises the defective desire case against unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories in this way, ‘Notoriously, we mistake our own interests. It is depressingly common that when 
even some of our strongest and most central desires are fulfilled, we are no better, even worse off’ 
(Griffin, 1986: 10). For Griffin, it is this point that means that, ‘the objection to the actual-desire 
account is overwhelming’ (Griffin, 1986: 10). Indeed, Griffin’s claim that we often misidentify our 
interests and subsequently desire those things that are not in our own interest to desire is one that 
seems to have considerable intuitive force. Therefore, any credible desire theory will need to account 
for this intuition in the form of answers to the problem of defective desires. 
There are three popular positions that a defender of non-mental state desire theories can take 
when confronted with the problem of defective desires. Each of these positions can also be used as a 
response to the related problems of Dead Sea apples and intrinsically quirky desires. The first position 
is to opt for an idealisation over an actualist desire account. Once we abandon the claim that actual 
desire fulfilments and frustrations constitute the welfare criterion, then we can argue that the 
idealisation process would necessarily disqualify all defective desires from affecting welfare. 
Consequently, defective desires would not be claimed to non-instrumentally enhance welfare when 
fulfilled because they are not desires that would survive idealisation. The idealisation approach to 
answering the problem of defective desires involves claiming that we could not hold these types of 
desires if we occupied an ‘ideal observer’ position (Bruckner, 2016: 4). The sort of features that an 
ideal observer would possess are contested and vary between rival idealisation accounts. However, 
commonly these accounts stipulate the hypothetical desires of a version of ourselves that possesses 
all, or all the relevant, information deemed necessary to inform our desires, and is free of cognitive 
mistakes when processing that information and forming desires (Carson, 2000: 223). Many of the 
more influential idealisation accounts, such as that of Richard Brandt, also stipulate that the person 
must fully appreciate the implications of the desire, ‘by repeatedly representing it, in an ideally vivid 
way, and at an appropriate time’ (Brandt, 1979: 113). This is supposed to make the person undergoing 
idealisation fully appreciative of the affective implications of the desire’s fulfilment as well as achieving 
a sufficient cognitive appreciation. According to many of these views, defective desires are a symptom 
of irrationality and incomplete knowledge – the removal of which through idealisation would remove 
them as problems for unrestricted non-mental state desire theories of welfare. The ability to take this 
                                                          
12 Crucially, Heathwood’s initial definition does not account for the possibility that not all desires that are bad 
for our welfare when fulfilled are likely be labelled defective by unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theorists. For example, we may for instance choose to pursue ethical considerations that require great 
personal sacrifice of our own personal welfare, and few people would call the desire that motivates that 
decision necessarily defective. Unless one is an egoist, or one holds the view that ethical and welfare concerns 
are extensionally equivalent or indeed reducible to one another – as Aristotle seems to have done (Sumner, 
1996: 79) –, then we must define defective desires in such a way that is not merely all desires where fulfilment 
detracts from welfare. Therefore, my formulation of defective desires refines Heathwood’s definition to 
encompass only those desires that it appears that non-mental state actualist desire theories seem forced to 
mistakenly classify as enhancing welfare when fulfilled. If readers are unhappy with the reformed definition, 
then they are free to substitute it with Heathwood’s original. The substantive points that follow are not 
dependent upon any precise formation. 
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line of argument against the problem of defective desires would seem to be one of the primary 
motivations for adopting an idealisation desire theory (Griffin, 1986: 21). Indeed, without the added 
benefits of increased extensional adequacy, it is difficult to see why someone would convolute their 
welfare theory with the idealisation account. Idealisation makes the desire theory significantly less 
conceptually frugal. 
Idealisation desire theories of welfare tend to be based on idealisation theories of rationality, 
which claim that we only have reasons to do that which we would be motivated to do from an ideal 
observer position. Idealisation desire theories of welfare go beyond idealisation theories of rationality 
by making the additional claim that one’s welfare is determined only by desires based on good 
reasons. While there is division on how the idealisation theories ought to be constructed, Hubin points 
out that these processes tend to emphasise the importance of true belief in forming welfare-
determining and reason-giving desires, ‘There is at least near unanimity that false beliefs need to be 
purged – typically supplanted with true ones’ (Hubin, 1996: 31). Therefore, the ideal observer position 
tends to be one from which the formation of true beliefs is consistent or constant. Idealisation 
accounts of welfare draw support from the claim that idealised desires still conform with the 
internalist requirement that our welfare is related to us by being present in our subjective desires 
(Rosati, 1996: 298). The account claims that these desires must then undergo the objective process of 
idealisation to work out exactly which desires determine our welfare13. I will not consider the merits 
of idealisation in being able to preserve the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state 
desire theories convincingly. It is enough to outline that this approach exists and is commonly 
motivated by problems of defective desires. However, it is worth noting that even if these theories 
are plausible and justifiable, it remains unclear whether idealisation would successfully remove all 
desires that are claimed to be defective (Bruckner, 2016: 12).  
The second approach to solving the problem of defective desires involves adopting a 
‘restricted’ non-mental state actualist desire theory. Restricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories claim that, while it is the fulfilment and frustration of actual desires that determines a 
person’s welfare, only a certain subset of actual desires count towards determining a person’s welfare 
when fulfilled or frustrated. According to restricted non-mental state actualist desire theories, 
everything that counts towards determining a person’s welfare is constituted by the fulfilment and 
frustration of that person’s actual desires. However, not all of a person’s actual desires count towards 
                                                          
13 The literature on desire theories is replete with references to ‘Full Information Theories’ or ‘Full Information 
Accounts’ (Bruckner, 2016: 11; Carson, 2000: 224; Loeb, 1995; Rosati, 1995). These accounts make the claim 
that what constitutes the welfare criterion is the fulfilment and frustration of the desires that an individual 
would hold had they had full information. Moreover, there is also frequent reference in the literature on this 
topic to ‘Ideal Observer’ theories of determining axiological value (Brandt, 1955; Carson, 2000: 204; Enoch, 
2005: 759). It is worth clarifying the relationship between these two theories and desire idealisation accounts. 
Full information accounts claim that the ideal observer for determining personal welfare is a version of 
ourselves with full information. Whereas, ideal observer accounts can specify more characteristics than simply 
full information, such as requiring cognitive changes in an individual (Brandt, 1979: 247). If an ideal observer 
account specifies a version of ourselves as being the genesis of the desires that determine our welfare, then it 
is a desire idealisation account. If the ideal observer account specifies an individual who is not a version of 
ourselves – such as a deity for example – as being the arbiter of the desires that determine our welfare, then it 
is not a desire idealisation account. This is because desire idealisation accounts are versions of ideal observer 
theories that maintain that welfare originates in subjective desires and not in external phenomenon. According 
to these definitions, all full information accounts of welfare are versions of desire idealisation accounts, and all 
desire idealisation accounts are versions of ideal observer accounts. Therefore, the term desire idealisation is 
used in this paper to refer to full information accounts and those ideal observer accounts that stipulate that it 
is idealised versions of our own desires that are determinative of our own welfare. 
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determining that person’s welfare when fulfilled or frustrated. We can contrast restricted accounts 
with idealisation accounts. Idealisation accounts claim that it is the fulfilment and frustration of a set 
of hypothetical desires that an ideal observer version of ourselves would have which determines our 
welfare; whereas restricted accounts claim that the fulfilment and frustration of a subset of our actual 
desires determines our welfare. The differences between these two approaches are subtle but 
significant, and non-mental state desire theories can be both restricted and idealisation theories. This 
difference is not always clearly marked in the literature and often these approaches are elided. 
However, they do represent distinct and alternative ways of conceptualising welfare14. A common 
version of the restricted desire theory claims that only desires about our own lives count towards 
determining our welfare (Carson, 2000: 75)15. How we work out exactly which desires are about our 
own lives and which are not is deeply contested terrain (Portmore, 2007: 27; Sobel, 1997: 506). 
Restricted desire theories can also be used to help combat the problem of defective desires. We can 
apply this model to the case of defective desires by claiming that the fulfilment and frustration of 
defective desires does not belong to the subset of actual desires that determines an individual’s 
welfare. A restricted actualist desire theory could claim that defective desires, Dead Sea apples and 
intrinsically quirky desires do not belong to the subset that determines welfare. Consequently, 
defective desire fulfilment and frustration need not contribute to welfare on the restricted desire 
account. Therefore, these theories can claim that the problem of defective desires can be navigated 
while preserving the non-mental state actualist desire theory framework.  
The third approach, which is the approach that I take, is to argue that defective desires, Dead 
Sea apples and intrinsically quirky desires simply do not exist in way that is problematic for non-mental 
state actualist desire theories to accommodate. In relation to defective desires, I claim that defective 
desires can be explained as being examples of all-things-considered bad for welfare desire fulfilments, 
and that this claim is not inconsistent with the observation that they do nevertheless generate some 
countervailing positive welfare in virtue of their fulfilment. Consequently, while these defective 
desires do exist, they do not exist in a way that causes problems for the extensional adequacy of the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. Therefore, we do not need to make claims about 
the necessity of restricting the types of desires that determine welfare to a subset of our wider desires 
or make appeals to idealisation accounts in order to solve the problem posed by defective desires. To 
make sense of the claim that defective desires are not a problem for unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theories we need to explore more thoroughly what people mean when they say that 
a desire is defective. My subsequent discussion about defective desires draws heavily on observations 
by Chris Heathwood, who has made a series of comprehensive arguments in his paper ‘The Problem 
of Defective Desires’ (2005) against the claim that defective desires undermine non-mental state 
actualist desire accounts16. 
 
                                                          
14 Tom Carson’s book Value and the Good Life (2000) contains a good example of a discussion that does make 
this distinction clear. 
15 Parfit terms restricted desire theories that count only those desires about our own lives ‘Success Theories’ 
(Parfit, 1984: 494). Success theories are only one possible way of restricting the desires that determine 
welfare. 
16 This is interesting given that Heathwood himself rejects non-mental state desire accounts primarily because 
of what he terms the problem of ‘remote desires’ (Heathwood, 2005: 500), and instead adopts a mental state 
desire theory / attitudinal hedonist theory, which he claims are extensionally equivalent (Heathwood, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Heathwood provides an important analysis and rebuttal of defective desire arguments against  
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. 
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All-things-considered bad for welfare desire fulfilments 
Heathwood outlines a list of defective desires that he divides into the following types: ‘ill-informed 
desires, irrational desires, base desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, artificially aroused 
desires, and the desire to be badly off’ (Heathwood, 2005: 487). These in turn he subdivides into three 
broad categories: ‘(i) arguments from ‘all-things-considered defective’ desires, (ii) arguments from 
‘intrinsically defective’ desires, and (iii) a third category to be named later’ (Heathwood, 2005: 490)17. 
I shall analyse some of Heathwood’s arguments, which can provide the basis for some convincing 
rebuffs to the argument from defective desires. However, before I begin considering defective desires, 
I want to suggest a reworking of the categories that Heathwood labels defective. Defective desires are 
those desires that intuitively seem to make our life go worse for us when fulfilled. However, it seems 
too strong a statement from Heathwood to claim that all the desires that he lists are examples of 
defective desires. Instead, I want to suggest that pointless desires, poorly cultivated desires, and 
artificially aroused desires seem to fit better into the category of intrinsically quirky desires. I also 
propose to add base desires to this category, for while there is a strong intuitive case to be made that 
these desires are defective – in that fulfilment intuitively detracts from welfare -, the sort of argument 
that we can employ to explain them bears more similarity to intrinsically quirky desires. These desires 
all fit into the category that Heathwood labels arguments from ‘intrinsically defective’ desires.  
The categorisation of a desire as quirky involves making a weaker claim than its categorisation 
as defective. Quirky desires are those where fulfilment is not necessarily bad for welfare but rather 
fulfilment is simply not good for welfare. In this way, quirky desires are an umbrella term that 
encompass defective desires alongside other problematic desires for the extensional adequacy of 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. Bruckner writes that, ‘A quirky desire is one 
that is difficult to understand or appears downright inscrutable, extremely strange, or unusual or 
maximally idiosyncratic’ (Bruckner, 2016: 2). Quirky desires pose a similar problem for unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire accounts to defective desires. This is because unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theories claim that the fulfilment of desires ought to be non-
instrumentally beneficial to welfare, and not simply be not bad for welfare. I shall save consideration 
of pointless desires, poorly cultivated desires, artificially aroused desires, and base desires until 
Chapter Four, which specifically deals with those ‘intrinsically’ quirky desires that are not considered 
in Chapters Two and Three. This chapter will confine itself to considering ill-informed desires and 
irrational desires as prime examples of defective desires. Heathwood claims that these desires can be 
explained as being ‘all-things-considered defective’. I think this is true of many ill-informed and 
irrational desires, but there are some troubling counterexamples that require additional explanation 
if we are to preserve the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories. These counterexamples come in the form of Dead Sea apples and will be examined in 
Chapter Three.  
Before progressing, let us recall our revised definition of what it means for a desire to be 
defective:  
                                                          
17 I do not examine this third category because it involves a paradox that can emerge when a person desires to 
be badly off. This paradox seeks to undermine the conceptual coherency rather than the extensional adequacy 
of unrestricted non-mental state idealisation desire theories. Ben Bradley’s paper ‘A Paradox for Some 
Theories of Welfare’ (2007) contains the most recent comprehensive discussion of this paradox that I am 
aware of. 
Atus Mariqueo-Russell  Birkbeck, University of London 
19 
 
Defective desires are those desires for things that are bad for a person’s welfare when fulfilled, 
but which are nevertheless taken by the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory to 
non-instrumentally enhance a person’s welfare if fulfilled. 
What is striking about this definition of defective desires is that upon inspection it is unclear why 
desires that are defective in this way undermine the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory. The above problem trades on the implicit assumption that being bad for welfare and non-
instrumentally enhancing welfare are mutually exclusive conditions, which when combined generate 
a paradoxical outcome that undermines the viability of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories. This is the same implicit assumption embedded in Heathwood’s formulation of the problem 
of defective desires for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories that, ‘sometimes, it is 
bad for a person to get what he wants’ (Heathwood, 2005: 487). It would follow then that a defender 
of an unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory would have to either reject the 
overwhelmingly intuitive claim that desire fulfilments can in some cases be bad for a person’s welfare 
or reject a central premise of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory: That the 
fulfilment of actual desires is what non-instrumentally enhances welfare.  
And yet, there is no reason why these two conditions of non-instrumentally enhancing and 
being bad for welfare need be mutually exclusive. If we treat ‘bad for’ and ‘non-instrumentally 
enhancing’ as constituent parts of the welfare effects of a desire fulfilment and not as claims about 
the aggregate or overall effect of a desire fulfilment, then it is perfectly possible for a desire fulfilment 
to be both bad for our welfare in some ways and non-instrumentally enhancing of it in others. 
Therefore, unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories can claim that an instance of desire 
fulfilment is overall bad for our welfare, while also maintaining that it in some respects non-
instrumentally enhances a person’s welfare. Making this claim allows for the preservation of the 
premise that desire fulfilment always non-instrumentally enhances welfare to an extent and adds to 
it the caveat that desire fulfilment is not always an overall good for welfare. This is necessary to explain 
our intuition that some desire fulfilments are bad for welfare. Heathwood claims that many desires 
that may seem intuitively defective can be explained in a way that is coherent with the non-mental 
state actualist desire theory as being all-things-considered bad for our welfare when fulfilled18. The 
fulfilment of these desires is all-things-considered bad for our welfare because, while some positive 
welfare is generated non-instrumentally by their fulfilment, this gain is outweighed by the 
instrumental negative effects on welfare of their fulfilment (Heathwood, 2005: 492). These 
instrumental negative welfare effects are generated by the frustration of other desires that are 
thwarted as a consequence of fulfilling an all-things-considered bad for welfare desire (Heathwood, 
2005: 493). Accordingly, the benefits of desire fulfilment are outweighed by the harms of desire 
frustration in cases of defective desire fulfilment. In Carson’s words, ‘[fulfilment of] ill-informed 
desires often frustrates other desires that are of greater importance to the agent’ (Carson, 2000: 73). 
                                                          
18 Sumner foreshadows Heathwood’s longer treatment of this in his book Welfare, Happiness and Ethics 
(1996), where he writes that, in cases where getting what we want is bad for us, ‘satisfying the desire made 
me to that extent better off, but it also frustrated other, more important desires, so that on balance I ended up 
worse off’ (Sumner, 1996: 131). This idea is also present in Carson’s book Value and the Good Life (2000), 
where he talks of desire fulfilment only being good for welfare ‘other things equal’ (Carson, 2000: 72) and not 
always good for welfare on aggregate. Going back even further, Henry Sidgwick gives a brief treatment of this 
issue when he writes of some desire fulfilments that, ‘in such cases the desired result is accompanied or 
followed by other effects which when they come excite aversion stronger than the desire for the desired 
effect’ (Sidgwick, 1907: 110). However, Heathwood’s consideration of this argument is the most extensive and 
systematic treatment of it in the literature, so my theoretical engagement is largely based on his formulation 
of the argument. 
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This explanation highlights that all that a defender of an unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory needs to claim for their theory to remain viable is that the fulfilment of defective desires does 
generate a degree of positive welfare. These theories are not committed to the deeply implausible 
claim that desire fulfilment is always all-things-considered good for a person’s welfare.  
The all-things-considered bad for welfare account also provides an intuitively plausible 
explanation of what happens when we act in accordance with ethical and other-regarding values over 
prudence. In these cases, it would seem that we are fulfilling a desire and thus, according to 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories, generating some welfare by acting in 
accordance with the pursuit of these values. At the same time, acting in accordance with ethical and 
other-regarding values often frustrates other self-directed desires that may, if they had been fulfilled, 
have generated more welfare and which would therefore be the prudentially prescribed course of 
action. The all-things-considered bad for welfare account can represent the intuition that often ethical 
actions do require a degree of self-sacrifice of a person’s welfare, while at the same time representing 
the intuition that often people do generate some welfare for themselves when acting ethically. 
Theories of welfare do not claim to have a monopoly on what constitutes rational action and are 
therefore compatible with the claim that other values may clash with and override our motivation to 
pursue our own welfare at least some of the time. Heathwood puts it like this, ‘If theories of welfare 
have any implications about behaviour, they imply only what we prudentially ought to do. But since 
sometimes I prudentially ought to do what I morally ought not to do, and sometimes morally ought to 
do what I prudentially ought not to do, theories of welfare on their own imply nothing about what we 
morally ought to do’ (Heathwood, 2005: 496).  
Utilising the all-things-considered bad for welfare position to explain unprudential desire 
fulfilments accounts for our intuitions about what happens in cases of ethical and other-regarding 
desire fulfilments, as well as providing an argument against the extensional inadequacy said to be 
generated by defective desire fulfilment. Without this explanation the non-mental state actualist 
desire theorist is left in the uncomfortable position of claiming that ethical action is as prudential as 
self-directed action, as both involve the fulfilment of desires. To avoid this conclusion, it is sometimes 
claimed that adopting a restricted desire theory is a necessary conceptual commitment of anyone 
trying to defend the non-mental state actualist desire theory (Portmore, 2007: 27). One of the reasons 
that people give for the necessity of adopting the restricted desire theory is to explain ethical action 
in a way that does not mean it is reduced to prudential action. According to this version of the 
restricted desire theory, only self-directed desires determine welfare. This allows for ethical and 
other-regarding desires to not be considered welfare-enhancing when fulfilled in the same way as self-
directed desires are, providing one way of accounting for these unprudential desire fulfilments. 
However, the all-things-considered bad for welfare explanation is able to explain unprudential desire 
fulfilments for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories in conceptually frugal way and 
without recourse to restrictions on the sorts of the desires that have standing when determining 
welfare. While the all-things-considered bad for welfare account of defective desire fulfilment would, 
if viable, answer the problem of defective desires, it remains to be seen whether this account can be 
convincingly applied to the whole range of desires that have been labelled defective. 
 There is a litany of examples that abound within the literature on defective desires that the 
all-things-considered bad for welfare argument can be employed to answer. To use Heathwood’s 
schema, we can begin with the case of ill-informed desires, which are a subset of defective desires. Ill-
informed desires are those desires that we hold on the basis of incomplete or false information. Clearly 
our desires are determined partly by our beliefs, and so if those beliefs are false or not adequately 
representative of all the relevant information, then they may generate desires that are ill-informed 
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and defective. An example of an ill-informed desire that Heathwood provides is the desire of a person 
to quench their thirst with water that unbeknownst to them contains poison (Heathwood, 2005: 491). 
They hold this desire on the basis of incomplete information and its fulfilment is clearly intuitively bad 
for them. Heathwood explains this intuition by referencing the all-things-considered badness of the 
desire for welfare. He points out that drinking the poison water will inevitably frustrate other stronger 
desires – the desire to not be in pain for example, as well as any desires that will be thwarted during 
the recovery period (providing that the poison is not fatal, and that the person is lucky enough to have 
a recovery period). Nevertheless, Heathwood contends that a small amount of positive welfare is 
generated from drinking the poison water, it is simply outweighed. In order to support his claim that 
a small amount of positive welfare is generated by consuming the poison water, he asks us to imagine 
that the poison takes a few minutes to take effect. In this time, we can imagine two hypothetical 
scenarios: One in which the person drinks the water and the world ends before the poison can take 
effect, and one in which the person does not drink the water and the world ends just before the poison 
would have taken effect. Heathwood claims that in the scenario in which the person did consume the 
poison water, their welfare is marginally higher than in the scenario in which they did not consume 
the poison water. This is because the scenario in which they did consume the poison water has all the 
benefits of the scenario in which they did not, plus the added bonuses of the experience of quenched 
thirst and the absence of the frustration of thirst (Heathwood, 2005: 492). This thought-experiment is 
designed to show that the all-things-considered bad for welfare account fits our intuitions about what 
happens when we satisfy an ill-informed desire. 
This example of Heathwood’s may seem trivial, and some people’s intuitions may reject the 
idea that the fulfilment of desires which have a comparatively small effect on a person’s overall life, 
such as quenching one’s thirst for a few minutes, can play any role in determining how well that life 
has gone for them. To represent this view within the non-mental state actualist desire framework, we 
could adopt a version of the restricted desire theory, which claims that only the fulfilment and 
frustration of a certain subset of our actual desires determines our welfare – such as, for example, a 
requirement that desires have a certain level of intensity or duration in order to qualify as welfare 
determining when fulfilled or frustrated. An example of a restricted desire theory that takes roughly 
this position is a goal theory. These theories claim that only those desires that are elevated to the 
status of actual goals are determinative of welfare (Keller, 2004: 28)19. However, to hold such a view 
does not eliminate the problem of ill-informed desires or the validity of Heathwood’s response to it – 
it simply confines the problem and its response to affecting only those desires that fall into the 
required subset of our desires that are considered determinative of welfare.  
                                                          
19 This statement is somewhat complicated by the fact that Keller defends in his paper, what he terms, an 
‘unrestricted goal theory’, which claims that the achievement or frustration of any goal, ‘even when [the] goals 
are crazy, self-destructive, irrational or immoral’ contributes to welfare (Keller, 2004: 27). Nevertheless, I think 
there is a good case to be made that goals are themselves a subset of our wider desires. In which case, Keller’s 
theory is a restricted desire theory, but an unrestricted goal theory. Indeed, Griffin and Carson both suggest 
that it is ‘global desires’ that determine welfare (Carson, 2000: 73; Griffin, 1986: 13). These ‘global desires’ are 
those desires that we have about our life as a whole and seem similar to the notion of goals. Goal theories 
themselves face the problem of defective goals, which is analogous to the problem of defective desires, with 
writers on both problems often drawing on the same examples (Keller, 2004: 30; Bruckner, 2016: 3). Goal 
theories / global desire theories are sometimes adopted to represent the intuition that minute desire 
fulfilments do not affect welfare; they have also been said to be in a stronger position to meet the challenges 
posed by the problem of changing desires, especially when combined with idealisation accounts (Carson, 2000: 
85-86). 
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For those who take this approach of restricting the desires that count to include only those 
deemed sufficiently important, Heathwood’s example can be easily reformulated so that something 
more significant is at stake than simply a few minutes of quenched thirst. Take the following example:  
you are offered an experimental pharmaceutical drug that you believe has the reliable benefit 
of enabling you function optimally without sleep in perpetuity. Unbeknownst to you the drug 
will cause sudden death after precisely one year of first consumption. You desire to take the 
drug because of the incomplete information that you possess about the harms that would come 
with consumption, combined with your correct beliefs about how optimal functioning without 
sleep could assist you in the fulfilment of other desires and therefore in the enhancement of 
your welfare. Had you known the full consequences of consuming the drug you would certainly 
reject it as being very bad for your welfare.  
As with the poison water case, we can appeal to the all-things-considered badness of this desire for 
welfare to explain why intuitively we reject the idea that its fulfilment would benefit your welfare. 
Nevertheless, we can plausibly claim that a degree of positive welfare is generated from the 
consumption of the drug, it is simply outweighed. This plausibility stems from the observations that 
without the need for sleep you could fulfil your desires to produce more things of artistic and 
intellectual merit, to have more leisure time, and to dedicate more time to building deep and 
meaningful personal relationships – all things that seem to our intuitions to be unproblematically 
beneficial desires to satisfy, and the achievement of some of which would surely constitute a goal. We 
can apply Heathwood’s hypothetical case of the two scenarios again to highlight this point: one in 
which you take the drug, experience the benefits, and the world ends before the fatal consequences 
of its consumption can take place, and the other in which you do not take the drug, do not experience 
these benefits, and the world ends just before the fatal consequences of its consumption would have 
taken place. When applying our intuitions to which scenario contains more welfare, it should be clear 
that the first scenario would undoubtedly contain significantly higher welfare than the second. This is 
because the first scenario contains all the benefits of the second in addition to the extra benefits that 
come with the fulfilment of other desires, while containing no additional harms. If the claim that desire 
fulfilment can be all-things-considered bad for welfare but nevertheless contains a degree of positive 
welfare works in this scenario, then opponents of the theory ought to supply reasons outlining why it 
ought not apply to other situations of ill-informed desire satisfaction. The difference between our two 
cases appears to be simply one of scale, not one of type, and therefore, so far, it looks like ill-informed 
desires can be reliably explained by non-mental state actualist desire accounts as being all-things-
considered bad for welfare. 
The all-things-considered bad for welfare explanation of what happens when we fulfil an ill-
informed desire can also be applied relatively straightforwardly to some other cases of defective 
desire fulfilment. In Heathwood’s words, what unites all these cases is that, ‘they are bad not in 
themselves but for what they lead to, or what they prevent’ (Heathwood, 2005: 491). He applies this 
same logic to irrational desires, where he claims that, ‘were the desire to be satisfied, a less favourable 
balance of desire satisfaction over frustration would result than would result if the desire were not 
satisfied’ (Heathwood, 2005: 493). To claim that a desire is irrational presupposes a criterion of 
rationality for desires. Whether desires are the sorts of things that it makes sense to call rational or 
irrational is fraught debate, as many writers in the Humean tradition take desire to be fundamentally 
arational in character, while others in different traditions argue that desires themselves can be 
rational or irrational (Hubin, 1991). However, there are some desires that we can label as 
straightforwardly irrational desires, such as for example the desire for both P and not-P to obtain 
simultaneously. In a case like this, it may be fair to say that the desire is irrational because it is both 
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logically unconceptualizable in a coherent way and subsequently logically unattainable20. While these 
desires are perhaps relatively uncontroversial to label irrational, their existence does not bear directly 
on the phenomenon of defective desires. This is because straightforwardly irrational desires are 
completely impossible to conceptualise in a coherent way, let alone fulfil, and therefore their 
fulfilment can never be bad for our welfare. The case of straightforwardly irrational desires is not what 
Heathwood has in mind when he discusses irrational desires. Instead, Heathwood’s position is that an 
irrational desire is an informed yet unprudential self-directed desire21. 
The example that Heathwood gives of irrational desires clarifies that he is discussing informed 
yet unprudential self-directed desires, ‘Suppose I need to see a dentist for a procedure that will require 
drilling. And suppose this time lack of information isn’t my problem: I know it is in my long-term 
interest to see the dentist. But I still want no part of it. Clearly, it would be bad for me not to go’ 
(Heathwood, 2005: 487-488). In this case, we have the example of a person with full information who 
chooses an unprudential self-directed desire fulfilment for presumably no rational reason. Sidgwick 
offers a hypothesis to explain what happens psychologically when we can act upon an informed yet 
unprudential self-directed desire. Sidgwick suggests that in these cases ‘bad effects are fore-seen but 
not fore-felt’ (Sidgwick, 1907: 110). If we accept this, then it would seem that, in these cases, we have 
an intellectual appreciation that the desire’s fulfilment will be bad for our welfare but that we fail to 
emotionally internalise that intellectual appreciation. Heathwood’s position is that, other things being 
equal, it is irrational to act unprudentially when pursuing a self-directed desire fulfilment. In cases like 
Heathwood’s dentist example, we have a prime example of someone failing to make full use of their 
beliefs and desires in order to choose prudential action, and instead opting for a harmful course of 
action to their welfare. I will not attempt to arbitrate on whether the pursuit of fulfilling informed yet 
unprudential desires is, other things being equal, irrational when it comes to our self-directed actions. 
The problem of ‘irrational desires’ in Heathwood’s sense exists despite the terminology we use to 
describe it. Whether or not we deem the label of irrational appropriate, we still have an example of a 
seemingly defective desire that a non-mental state actualist desire theory will need to account for.  
As with cases of ill-informed desires, many examples of irrational desires can easily be 
accommodated by the all-things-considered bad for welfare argument in order to explain how we can 
maintain that desire fulfilment enhances welfare in some respects while nevertheless detracting from 
welfare in other respects. The temporal gap in Heathwood’s example is useful to illustrate this. By not 
going to the dentist now I appreciate the benefits of avoiding an unpleasant situation in the present 
                                                          
20 Note that the example of the desire for P and not-P to obtain should not be confused with cases of 
countervailing desires. Countervailing desires emerge when we have two or more desires that weigh in on 
either side of us wanting/being aversive to a proposition being fulfilled. For example, I may have a desire to eat 
an éclair in order to experience some sensory pleasure and a countervailing desire not to eat the éclair in order 
to avoid the deleterious health consequences of excessive sugar consumption. This is a perfectly rational case 
of countervailing desires, where we do in some sense want both P and not-P to obtain. In these cases, we have 
two logical but opposing desires, for P and not-P. While only one can be fulfilled, both are independently 
conceptualizable and independently logically possible. Countervailing desires are present in everyone to some 
extent (Carson, 2000: 233). However, a straightforwardly irrational desire would be to want P and not-P to 
obtain as a single integrated desire. The fulfilment of this type of desire is simply logically unconceptualizable 
and subsequently logically unattainable, and therefore is a good candidate for the title of a straightforwardly 
irrational desire. 
21 The notion of an informed yet unprudential self-directed desire can be dismissed by an idealisation account 
as being impossible. Such accounts can claim that an informed yet unprudential self-directed desire is a logical 
impossibility. Either the desire is not informed, or it is not self-directed, or it is not unprudential; a desire could 
not be all three simultaneously, or so the argument goes. 
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in exchange for far worse consequences in the long term22. Yet as with our previous examples of ill-
informed desires, we can contrast hypothetical scenarios to illustrate that the fulfilment of the 
irrational desire itself does generate some positive welfare. If the world were to end at the end of the 
day of my dentist appointment, then my life would have gone better for me for having avoided the 
unpleasant experience and instead doing something else. The fulfilment of the irrational desire itself 
then seems to benefit welfare, it is only the wider consequences that make it unprudential. Therefore, 
if a person wishes to pursue an irrational desire, then, while the desire fulfilment does generate some 
positive welfare, it also necessarily obstructs other desires that they hold or could cultivate, and which 
would, if fulfilled, have led to higher welfare generation than the irrational desire would have. At the 
risk of giving the case of irrational desires a perfunctory treatment, I shall not examine these types of 
cases further. If we accept the explanation of fulfilment being all-things-considered bad for welfare in 
the case of ill-informed desires, then irrational desires are analogous enough to also be accepted 
without further investigation. However, while this explanation does work well for many irrational and 
ill-informed desires, we do seem to face a set of counterexamples where it is much harder to claim 
that fulfilment generates any welfare whatsoever. This problem has been termed the problem of Dead 
Sea apples in the literature. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by considering the problem that many of our desires would intuitively appear not 
to enhance our welfare when fulfilled. I then outlined three possible responses to this observation: 
Adopting an idealisation theory, adopting a restricted desire theory, or attempting to explain this 
phenomenon in a way that does not undermine the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory. I then turned my attention to defective desires and claimed that Heathwood’s all-things-
considered bad for welfare explanation can provide an adequate account of why defective desires do 
not undermine the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. I observed that this 
explanation is also necessary if we are to make sense of ethical and other-regarding desire fulfilments 
without resorting to a restricted desire account. I then focused on two particular types of defective 
desire fulfilments, those that are ill-informed and those that are irrational. The examples I considered 
of these types were found to be adequately explained by the all-things-considered bad for welfare 
account. I now move onto consider a set of counterexamples that the all-things-considered bad for 
welfare account finds more challenging to intuitively answer. These are found in the existence of what 
have been termed Dead Sea apples. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 I leave aside the issue of whether such temporal discounting is in itself irrational and for the sake of 
argument assume with Heathwood that it is. Although I think there are good reasons for thinking that 
temporal discounting is often unjustifiable on the social level (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). 
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Chapter 3: The problem of Dead Sea apples 
 
Dead Sea Apples 
The examples that Heathwood provides of defective desire fulfilments that can be answered by the 
all-things-considered bad for welfare argument involve cases of ill-informed and irrational desire 
fulfilments where there are some clear intuitively perceptible beneficial consequences of the desire 
fulfilment for welfare. Moreover, these beneficial consequences are built into the desire for the object 
itself and are not simply incidental or unforeseen consequences of the desire fulfilment. I benefit from 
drinking the poison water because it quenches my thirst, I benefit from consumption of the sleep 
conquering pharmaceutical drug because it enables me to fulfil other desires, and I benefit from 
avoiding the dentist because I avoid a painful experience in favour of less onerous activities. These 
benefits are of course all outweighed by the accompanying deleterious consequences for welfare, but 
their existence is nevertheless clearly intuitively perceptible. This intuitive perceptibility supports the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory’s premise that actual desire fulfilments enhance 
welfare. The temporal gap between the immediate benefits to welfare of desire fulfilment and the 
long-term harmful consequences in Heathwood’s examples makes the all-things-considered bad for 
welfare argument eminently plausible when used to explain them. This is useful for illustrative 
purposes because it shows how the all-things-considered bad for welfare argument can work. 
However, objectors may claim when presented with this argument that the fulfilment of all ill-
informed and irrational desires need not necessarily involve any such clear intuitively perceptible 
beneficial consequences. These objectors can point to compelling counterexamples of ill-informed 
and irrational desire fulfilments that do not involve a temporal lag between immediately clearly 
intuitively perceivable beneficial consequences for welfare and longer-term harmful consequences. 
Indeed, they can point to examples where desire fulfilments contain no clearly intuitively perceivable 
beneficial consequences for welfare at all. These counterexamples make the claim that the all-things-
considered bad for welfare argument solves the problems of ill-informed and irrational desires for 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories much harder to defend. 
It would be disingenuous of defenders of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory to point to cases where there are clear intuitively perceptible beneficial consequences of ill-
informed and irrational desire fulfilments without considering these counterexamples. Consequently, 
all that Heathwood and I have succeeded in showing thus far is that there are such things as all-things-
considered bad desire fulfilments for welfare, and that some cases of ill-informed and irrational desire 
fulfilments can be explained through appeal to the all-things-considered bad for welfare argument. 
We have not shown that every instance of desire fulfilment contains at least an amount, however 
small, of positive welfare generation, and which therefore makes every instance of ill-informed and 
irrational desire fulfilment at least all-things-considered bad for welfare and never completely devoid 
of any positive welfare generation. Therefore, we will need to provide additional reasons to support 
the claim that all ill-informed and irrational desires do indeed make some positive contribution to 
welfare when fulfilled. I think that this claim can be persuasively made, but I accept that the challenge 
to show this is greater than the examples of the poison water drinker, sleep conquering 
pharmaceutical drug taker, and dentist absconder suggest. In order to find the most compelling 
counterexamples to the all-things-considered bad for welfare explanation of ill-informed and 
irrational desires, we will have to consider cases of Dead Sea apple desire fulfilments. 
The use of the term Dead Sea apples to describe desire fulfilments that do not benefit a 
person’s welfare in any way at all appears to have its origins in Henry Sidgwick’s book The Methods of 
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Ethics (1907). There he writes of some desire fulfilments that, ‘It would still seem that what is desired 
at any time is, as such, merely apparent Good, which may not be found good when fruition comes, or 
at any rate not so good as it appeared. It may turn out a ‘Dead Sea apple,’ mere dust and ashes in the 
eating’ (Sidgwick, 1907: 110). This rather poetic description of some desire fulfilments being 
completely devoid of any benefit to welfare and therefore being analogous to the eating of the 
mythical Dead Sea apples, said to turn to dust and ash in the mouth, captures the type of desire that 
is unexplainable by the all-things-considered bad for welfare explanation of ill-informed and irrational 
desire fulfilments23. If such Dead Sea apples do exist, then their existence poses a problem for 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories, which claim that all actual desire fulfilments 
enhance welfare at least by a small amount. The problem of Dead Sea apples led to Sidgwick 
suggesting the adoption of an idealisation theory for those who want to preserve a non-mental state 
desire theory (Sidgwick, 1907: 111)24. To date the most comprehensive discussion of Dead Sea apples 
in relation to desire theories of welfare that I am aware of is provided by William Lauinger. His paper 
‘Dead Sea Apples and Desire Fulfillment Welfare Theories’ (2011) follows Sidgwick’s observation in 
claiming that the existence of Dead Sea apples undermines unrestricted non-mental state actualist 
desire theories. Moreover, he goes further than Sidgwick and claims that the existence of Dead Sea 
apples also undermines non-mental state idealisation theories of welfare as well (Lauinger, 2011). 
Lauinger’s concern is later echoed by Brucker, who points out that even if idealisation accounts of 
welfare were able to navigate other serious concerns people have raised about them, then they would 
still not necessarily remove the offending defective desires problem, of which Dead Sea apples are the 
most pertinent example (Bruckner, 2016: 12). 
Heathwood gives a very brief consideration to the problem of Dead Sea apples in his paper 
‘The Problem of Defective Desires’ (2015) but dismisses the problem quickly as unthreatening to those 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories that also adopt the concurrence view of 
welfare generation (Heathwood, 2015: 493). Perhaps because Heathwood himself does not endorse 
a non-mental state desire theory at all, he does not consider alternatives to adopting the concurrence 
view to answer the problem posed by Dead Sea apples. However, accepting the concurrence view has 
major ramifications on the sorts of things that determine welfare, and therefore it is a worthwhile 
investigation to see whether the adoption of such a view is truly necessary in order to preserve the 
extensional adequacy of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. We may have 
independent reasons for accepting the concurrence view, but it remains to be seen whether its 
acceptance is the only viable response to the problem of Dead Sea apples for unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theories. This is something that Heathwood fails to show, or indeed consider, in 
his paper. I will examine the concurrence view shortly, but to pre-empt that discussion slightly, it is 
not a position that I find convincing. More importantly, it is not a necessary theoretical commitment 
for those who wish to adopt an unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. There are 
alternative and compelling solutions available to the problem of Dead Sea apples for unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theories. Therefore, Heathwood’s discussion warrants updating to 
consider how we can remain agnostic on the concurrence view and nevertheless preserve the 
extensional adequacy of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. 
I make two separate arguments in order to preserve the extensional adequacy of the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory without appeal to the concurrence view. Firstly, 
                                                          
23 According to some renditions of the Dead Sea apples myth, the apple turns to smoke or ashes when plucked 
from the tree, rather than dust and ashes when eaten (Lauinger, 2011: 324). 
24 Readers should note that the terminology I am using here did not exist when Sidgwick wrote. However, I am 
confident that these terms nevertheless are being employed accurately to capture the outline of his views. 
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I claim that many examples given of Dead Sea apples fail to describe instances of actual desire 
fulfilments at all. Therefore, these cases can be dismissed as unproblematic to the extensional 
adequacy of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. Secondly, I claim that those 
examples that are put forward as Dead Sea apples, and that do describe actual desire fulfilments, are 
not actually Dead Sea apples. This second argument involves making the claim that there are good 
reasons to think that these cases do involve some degree of welfare enhancement, and thus fit into 
the mould of being all-things-considered bad for welfare and consequently unproblematic for 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. If these arguments are successful, then we will 
have extinguished the problem of Dead Sea apples arising from ill-informed and irrational desire 
fulfilments for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. This is done by claiming that, 
despite some pre-theoretical intuitions to the contrary, Dead Sea apples simply do not exist. Indeed, 
the existence of Dead Sea apples is incompatible with unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories.  
To illustrate the type of ill-informed desire fulfilment that is not so obviously all-things-
considered bad for welfare, and would seem a strong candidate to qualify as a Dead Sea apple, we can 
construct the following example:  
I desire to drink the coffee on the table in front of me. My desire is based on the belief that the 
coffee will taste pleasing and therefore I proceed to add sugar to the contents of the mug. I take 
a sip of the contents of the mug, only to experience an immediate and unmitigated disgust. My 
desire to drink the coffee was based upon the incorrect belief that I had been adding sugar, 
when I had in fact been mistakenly adding salt. I gain no pleasure from the experience and no 
feeling of subjective desire satisfaction is aroused within me. 
The above example differs from the cases of the poison water drinker and that of the sleep conquering 
pharmaceutical drug taker because the case of the salted coffee does not contain any clear intuitively 
perceptible component of compensatory positive welfare generation in the same way as our other 
examples do. In the salted coffee case, the negative experience is instantaneous and not deferred, 
and this immediacy means that we cannot point to any obvious benefits of the desire’s fulfilment 
through appeals to Heathwood’s comparisons of two world ending scenarios. Recall that this thought 
experiment involves getting us to imagine two scenarios: One in which we experience the benefits 
without the harms, and one in which we do not experience either the benefits or the harms. In the 
example he gives of the poisoned water case, there is a temporal lag between the immediate benefits 
and the deferred harms. Because the benefits and harms are present at different temporal locations, 
it is easy to show that welfare is affected both positively and negatively in different measures by this 
desire’s fulfilment. Yet this temporal lag is not present in the salted coffee case, and there are no 
clearly intuitively perceivable benefits for welfare that we can point to, making the all-things-
considered bad for welfare argument intuitively difficult to apply. Indeed, an objector to the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory can appeal to strong intuitions that the 
fulfilment of this desire is completely devoid of any positive welfare generation whatsoever. We have 
here a strong candidate for a Dead Sea apple in the case of the salted coffee, and one that, if left 
unanswered, seems to undermine a central premise of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories: That welfare enhancement is present to an extent in all instances of desire fulfilment. It is 
this sort of Dead Sea apple desire fulfilment that poses the challenge that this chapter is concerned 
with. Without adopting a restricted or an idealisation version of the desire theory, the non-mental 
state actualist desire theorist has three alternative ways of responding to this challenge. The first 
approach is to accept the concurrence view. The second approach is to give an alternative account of 
why Dead Sea apple examples do not describe actual desire fulfilments. And the third approach is to 
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claim that Dead Sea apple examples do describe actual desire fulfilments, but that these fulfilments 
can be explained by the all-things-considered bad for welfare account and are therefore not actually 
Dead Sea apples. I think that our understanding of what happens when we encounter a Dead Sea 
apple example is best accounted for through a mixture of the second and third approaches. But firstly 
I will examine in more depth what the concurrence view claims and why we should be reluctant to 
appeal to it to solve this problem. 
 
The concurrence view 
The concurrence view claims that a person must be desiring a state of affairs at the same time as the 
state of affairs occurs in order for welfare to be generated25. Heathwood defines concurrence views 
as stipulating that, ‘A desire of mine is satisfied only if [I] get the thing while I still desire it, and continue 
to have the desire while I’m getting it. The theory above therefore does not take the duration of a 
desire to be as prudentially significant as some have taken it to be’ (Heathwood, 2005: 490). It is the 
requirement that we continue to desire an experience when getting it that allows Heathwood to 
dismiss Dead Sea apples as not being problems for the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory. Dead Sea apples are no longer problems for the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory that adopts the concurrence view because under this view Dead Sea apple examples do not 
describe instances of actual desire fulfilments at all. Indeed, the problem of Dead Sea apples could be 
taken as a motivating reason to adopt the concurrence view as a way of preserving the extensional 
adequacy of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. For Heathwood, his acceptance 
of the concurrence view means that compensatory welfare generation is built into the very definition 
of every instance of desire fulfilment. For if we were to lose the desire for a state of affairs’ 
continuation at the moment that we perceive the desired state of affairs’ occurrence, then we would 
not have achieved actual desire fulfilment at all on his definition. If the desire persists after fulfilment, 
even for a short time, then Heathwood can point to this as evidence of at least some positive welfare 
being generated from fulfilment. This evidence of some positive welfare being generated preserves 
the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory’s premise that desire fulfilments always 
enhance welfare to an extent, even if in some instances they are all-things-considered bad for welfare. 
Therefore, Heathwood’s position navigates the problem posed by Dead Sea apples by claiming that 
these examples do not describe instances of actual desire fulfilment at all, let alone instances of ill-
informed or irrational desire fulfilments devoid of any welfare generation.  
However, adopting the concurrence view does come with its own unique set of limitations 
and theoretical commitments that may undermine some of the intuitive appeal of unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theories. Firstly, it requires us to claim that the length of time that we 
hold a desire for does not non-instrumentally affect the welfare generated by its fulfilment. This 
means that prudentially we have no non-instrumental reasons to fulfil more long-standing desires 
than we do more recently acquired desires. To offer some amelioration of this concern, we can point 
to instrumental reasons to fulfil long-standing desires over newly acquired desires. For example, the 
persistence of long-standing desires is often evidence of their intensity and, according to unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theories, the intensity of a desire does affect the welfare generated 
by its fulfilment. Moreover, we can claim that such intensity rarely exists in newly acquired desires, 
                                                          
25 The theory also says that a person must have an aversion to a state of affairs at the same time that the state 
of affairs is experienced in order for negative welfare to be generated. For the sake of simplicity, I shall speak 
primarily of (positive) welfare generation and not of negative welfare generation and leave the reader to apply 
the same observations symmetrically to desire frustrations. 
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and that we may often be mistaken in our beliefs about our desires when we attribute high intensity 
to newly acquired desires. Therefore, prudence may consistently recommend the fulfilment of long-
standing desires over newly acquired desires. Nevertheless, this explanation may not satisfy 
everyone’s intuitions, for it still allows for some newly acquired desires of high intensity to displace 
long-standing life goals as being the prudential course of action. Committing to this view may be 
descriptively inadequate to some people’s intuitions, which often seem to suggest that long-standing 
desires ought to count more to welfare when fulfilled for non-instrumental reasons than newly 
acquired desires26. That is not to say that we should presume that the fulfilment of long-standing 
desires matters non-instrumentally more than the fulfilment of newly acquired desires to welfare. 
Intuitions are divided by this issue, and it is by no means implausible to accept Heathwood’s position 
that the duration of a desire does not have non-instrumental effects on the welfare generated by its 
fulfilment. The point of this discussion is simply to highlight that there is a debate to be had about this 
issue, but that adopting the concurrence view in response to the problem of Dead Sea apples 
necessarily commits one to the stance in this debate that the length of time that a desire is held does 
not non-instrumentally affect the welfare generated by its fulfilment. 
A related issue for concurrence views occurs when we observe that often our present desires 
are ‘future-directed’. Future-directed desires are those that stipulate concerns about what happens 
in the future. For example, my desire for my favoured sports team to win their respective league 
competition is a future-directed desire as it is something that I do not want to happen, and indeed 
could not happen, immediately. Whereas my desire to eat an éclair may be one that I desire to happen 
immediately and is therefore presently-directed. If a desire is future-directed, then it may be 
intuitively plausible to suggest that what happens in the future may matter to the welfare effects of 
the desire’s fulfilment or frustration, even if the desire ceases to be experienced before its fulfilment 
or frustration occurs. We can call those desires that were previously held by a person but that no 
longer persist within them ‘past desires’. To complicate matters, the fulfilment of some future-
directed desires seems to matter to us in the present, independently of whether we continue to hold 
that desire into the future. Dorsey points out that the welfare effects of these types of future-directed 
desires intuitively seem not to be contingent on the desire’s own persistence (Dorsey, 2013: 158). For 
example, an ardent vegetarian may have a desire in the present that in the future they continue to 
abide by vegetarian ethical standards, irrespectively of whether they continue to have a desire to 
abide by those ethical standards in the future. They may also have a meta-desire to continue to have 
the desire to abide by vegetarian ethical standards, but the actual fulfilment of their desire to abide 
by vegetarian ethical standards may matter to them in the present independently of whether that 
meta-desire is fulfilled. In these types of cases, the person experiencing a desire would claim that they 
presently desire for X to happen in the future, irrespective of whether they continue to desire X to 
happen in the future. A prime example of such cases are desires held for events to happen after an 
individual’s death, when the person experiencing the desire knows that they will not be experiencing 
the continuation of the desire at the time of its fulfilment or frustration. Given that such desires do 
exist almost universally across persons and given that they can often be felt with intensity, there may 
be intuitive force behind the claim that the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory – a 
theory which is draws part of its appeal for representing the range of people’s desires – ought to allow 
for fulfilment and frustration of these types of desires to effect welfare. Conversely, the value that we 
place on other types of desires does appear to be completely contingent upon their own persistence. 
                                                          
26 Indeed, the intuition that we ought to value long-standing desires in a different way to fleeting desires is one 
of the concerns motivating the adoption of a ‘goal theory’ (Keller, 2004), or ‘global desire theory’ (Carson, 
2000: 73; Griffin, 1986: 13). These theories only count the fulfilment and frustration of goals or global desires 
as determining a person’s welfare. 
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For example, when reflecting upon my desire to eat an éclair for breakfast tomorrow, I can observe 
that it is something that I presently desire to happen in the future only for as long as continue to desire 
it in the future. With these types of future-directed desires, we can understand of a person that they 
presently desire for X to happen in the future, only for as long as they continue to desire for X to 
happen in the future. In these cases, the value that is placed on the desire in the present is tied to the 
continuation of that desire into the future. Intuitively it seems that without the desire’s persistence 
there seems to be no welfare generated from the fulfilment or frustration of my desire to eat the 
éclair in the future. The division between which desires are contingent upon their own persistence 
and which desires seem to involve propositions, at the time of desiring, that fulfilment is important 
irrespective of the desire’s persistence, is unclear. Nevertheless, there are examples of desires that 
fall sharply into either category, as the cases of vegetarianism and the desire for the éclair show.  
Consequently, the concurrence view entails that we do not have any reason to fulfil or give 
motivating weight to past desires that we no longer experience27. Yet, if someone holds a desire for 
the majority of their life, and it is the sort of desire where the value of fulfilment is not intuitively 
contingent upon the desire’s own persistence, but ceases to experience that desire minutes before 
fulfilment, it is not intuitively obvious that the desire’s fulfilment would not benefit their welfare at 
all. To say that past desires may influence someone’s welfare is not to say that their fulfilment 
influences welfare equally to presently existing desires. The claim that the fulfilment and frustration 
of past desires matters to welfare is compatible with the claim that they matter less to welfare. 
Whether these desires ought to be treated differently in their welfare determining effects to presently 
existing desires is an issue beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, it is not by any means 
implausible to claim that the fulfilment and frustration of past desires does not influence welfare non-
instrumentally at all. Nevertheless, it should be clear that there is a debate to be had here when it 
comes to constructing a theory of welfare representative of our intuitions. Adopting the concurrence 
view in order to answer the problem of Dead Sea apples closes down that debate and should therefore 
be avoided if possible at this stage of our investigation.  
An additional theoretical commitment of the concurrence view is that they entail that present 
desires we have for past events also cannot affect welfare (Lukas, 2010: 18). Consequently, if I strongly 
                                                          
27 Mark Vorobej defends the thesis that we do have reason to give weight to past desires that we no longer 
hold when considering the prudential course of action (Vorobej, 1998: 306). His position is that, ‘relevant 
desires held during some period need not be satisfied during that very period in order for their satisfaction to 
be capable of positively affecting someone’s overall welfare’ (Vorobej, 1998: 310). Therefore, the fulfilment of 
past desires that someone no longer holds at the time of fulfilment can affect how well someone’s life has 
gone for them overall on his view. However, Vorobej does not think that the fulfilment of a past desire at a 
later date makes a person’s life go better at any one particular moment. If I fulfil a desire I no longer have, my 
welfare is not improved at the moment of fulfilment, nor during the period in which I held the desire, but my 
life has gone better overall according to Vorobej. Vorobej also uses the same argument to claim that 
posthumous desire fulfilment and frustration can affect an individual’s overall welfare (Vorobej, 1998: 313). 
However, Dale Dorsey considers this to be a ‘disastrous result’ as it entails that we have cases of welfare 
generation without temporal location, making it impossible to measure welfare at different points of a 
person’s life (Dorsey, 2013: 154). Instead, Dorsey makes an argument for giving weight to the welfare effects 
of past desires but departs from Vorobej by claiming that our welfare is improved at a specific moment. The 
moment that he claims welfare is improved at is during the time in which we experience the past desire, and 
not when the desire that is no longer held is fulfilled (Dorsey, 2013: 152). Therefore, according to this view, 
actions that we undertake in the future can affect how well our life was going for us in the past, as well as 
affecting how well our life goes for us overall. Dorsey holds this view partly because he thinks that we ought to 
give an analogous treatment to temporally distant desires as we do to spatially distant desires (Dorsey, 2013: 
158). I mention these positions simply to highlight that there is a vibrant and ongoing debate about past desire 
fulfilment and posthumous benefits and harms. 
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desire for a temporally distant ancestor of mine to have had a virtuous or high welfare life, then the 
objective fact about whether they did lead such a life cannot affect my welfare on the concurrence 
view. Finally, adopting the concurrence view rules out the possibility of claiming that posthumous 
events can impact a person’s welfare. Consequently, Dorsey points out that the unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theory would be committed to an interesting asymmetry in its treatment 
of spatial distance in comparison to its treatment of temporal distance (Dorsey, 2013: 158). Recall that 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories allow for desire fulfilments that do not affect 
our mental states either directly or indirectly to nevertheless effect our welfare. Such instances Dorsey 
terms examples of spatial distance in desire fulfilments. Whereas, Griffin describes the fulfilment of 
spatially distant desires as being those that fail to meet ‘The Experience Requirement’ that we 
examined in Chapter One (Griffin, 1986: 13). Conversely, temporal distance is present when a desire 
is fulfilled or frustrated at any point after the person desiring ceases to hold the desire. Dorsey raises 
the interesting question of why a theory would be justified in treating these spatial distances in some 
desire fulfilments as nevertheless not disqualifying them from affecting welfare, while at the same 
time rejecting the idea that temporal distance in desire fulfilments can ever affect welfare (Dorsey, 
2013: 158). If I hold a strong present desire for life to exist on Mars today, and unbeknownst to me 
that desire turns out to be fulfilled immediately, then the unrestricted non-mental state actualist 
desire theory claims that my welfare is enhanced. This is despite the fate that this desire fulfilment 
does not affect my mental states either directly or indirectly. But if I hold a strong present desire for 
life to exist on Mars at some point, and unbeknownst to me that desire turns out to be fulfilled in 
three hundred years’ time, then the concurrence view combined with the unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theory claims that my welfare is not enhanced. Intuitively it seems wrong that 
the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory gives a different answer in these two cases, 
with only the first being granted the status of enhancing welfare. After all, both cases do not involve 
a person’s mental states being affected either directly or indirectly, and both cases describe very 
similar types of desire being fulfilled. Therefore, it may seem intuitively strange that the temporal 
location of the desire’s fulfilment can be used to disqualify one from affecting welfare but not the 
other. Dorsey claims that to treat these two different types of distance asymmetrically is inconsistent 
and bizarre, and therefore we ought to abandon either the concurrence view or the non-mental 
statism that allows for spatial distance. While people’s intuitions diverge sharply on this issue, the 
theoretical commitment that temporal distance prohibits a desire form affecting welfare but spatial 
distance does not may be a counterintuitive implication of the concurrence view to some (Sumner, 
1996: 127). Consequently, we can see that adopting the concurrence view necessarily entails the 
commitment to a whole range of conclusions that some advocates of the unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theorist may want to avoid. Commitment to such a view as a solution to the 
problem of Dead Sea apples should therefore be avoided if possible to allow for a consideration of the 
merits of these conclusions on an individual basis. 
I reject the concurrence view primarily because I find that it commits me to other conclusions 
that I find to be extensionally and descriptively inadequate and therefore want to avoid. Particularly, 
I find convincing Dorsey’s observation that an asymmetrical treatment of spatial and temporal 
distance seems unwarranted. There has not been enough space in this discussion to comprehensively 
make the case that the fulfilment and frustration of past desires can in some cases affect welfare, or 
to explain in which cases they do affect welfare, or exactly how and to what degree they affect welfare. 
However, I hope to have shown the reader that we have good reasons to at least be hesitant in 
adopting the concurrence view as a solution to the problem of Dead Sea apples. At the very least, its 
adoption is by no means as obvious a solution to the problem of Dead Sea apples as Heathwood’s 
brief discussion would have us believe. This is especially so if the problem of Dead Sea apples can be 
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solved within an unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory’s framework without appeal to 
the concurrence view, as I believe that it can be. An alternative solution to the problem of Dead Sea 
apples for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories can be found by drawing upon the 
same basic conclusion that concurrence views give of examples of Dead Sea apples, which is to claim 
that they simply do not exist. Indeed, there is something plausible about the concurrence view’s 
conclusion that examples of Dead Sea apples fail to describe instances of actual desire fulfilments at 
all and therefore do not undermine unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. What is 
undesirable about the concurrence view is the reasoning that it gives for claiming that Dead Sea apples 
do not exist, as this reasoning entails the adoption of other theoretical commitments that we may 
wish to avoid. There is an alternative position that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories can take instead that involves different reasoning and therefore a different set of 
accompanying theoretical commitments. I find these additional theoretical commitments to be far 
more intuitively plausible in maintaining the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theories than those implied by the concurrence view.  
 
The Hubin-inspired desire theory of welfare 
An alternative approach to solving the problem of Dead Sea apples for non-mental state actualist 
desire theories can be constructed from observations found in Donald Hubin’s paper, ‘Hypothetical 
Motivation’ (1996). In this paper, Hubin develops and defends an account of reasons which claims that 
reasons are generated by our actual motivations28. Accounts of reasons are concerned with 
understanding what conditions give rise to reasons for actions. Hubin’s account of reasons is 
developed as an alternative to the adoption of an idealisation account of reasons, which he finds to 
be inadequate and unnecessary (Hubin, 1996: 40). The adoption of an idealisation account over an 
actual motivation account of reasons is often driven by problems of ‘defective motivations’, a problem 
which mirrors much of our own discussion of defective desires. Idealisation accounts of reasons state 
that we have reason to do whatever we would be motivated to do in a set of idealised circumstances. 
The claim that reasons are generated by our actual motivations faces a whole range of 
counterexamples of seemingly defective motivations that would generate extensionally inadequate 
reasons for action. Consequently, we may be inclined to adopt an idealisation approach to 
understanding reasons for action because actual motivation theories seem committed to the claim 
that reasons are generated by defective motivations. Hubin formulates the problem of defective 
motivations in this way, ‘The view that one has reason to do whatever one is moved to do is too crude. 
Sometimes our motivation would not hold up to a moment’s reflection: appreciation of the cause of 
our motivation, its nature, or the real effects of acting in accordance with it may annihilate the 
motivation’ (Hubin, 1996: 31). However, in response to the problem of defective motivations, Hubin 
defends the position that we can account for reasons by claiming that they arise from our own actual 
intrinsic motivations, rather than our actual motivations in general. This position he labels an ‘actual 
intrinsic motivation’ account of reasons (Hubin, 1996: 33). His actual intrinsic motivation account of 
reasons is a rival theory to idealisation accounts of reasons and involves a separate solution of the 
problem of defective motivations. This solution is based on the claim that actual intrinsic motivations 
                                                          
28 I am using the term motivation instead of desire here because Hubin’s account references motivations 
rather than desires. That said, I take the two to describe similar, if not identical, subjective states of having a 
favourable attitude towards a proposition, which in turn can lead us to act to bring about the proposition’s 
occurrence. If this analogous treatment between motivation and desire is not what Hubin has in mind, then 
not too much hangs on it. I examine Hubin’s account of reasons and motivation only to show how observations 
from it can be relevant to our consideration of desires and welfare. 
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can never be defective, and that when we experience a defective motivation, it is in fact an 
instrumental motivation. Since instrumental motivations do not generate reasons for action, their 
defectiveness does not lead the theory to make extensionally inadequate claims about reasons for 
action. Therefore, Hubin believes that he has solved the problem of defective motivations for actual 
intrinsic motivational accounts of reasons.  
Hubin notes that his position involves a theoretical commitment to certain views about what 
constitutes an intrinsic motivation, ‘This view depends on conceiving of motivation as having a roughly 
hierarchical structure: some motivation is dependent, in familiar ways, on other motivation together 
with beliefs about the world’ (Hubin, 1996: 44). Nevertheless, the observation that some motivations 
are purely instrumental to the fulfilment of intrinsic motivations seems to be intuitively plausible. An 
example of a purely instrumental motivation can be constructed as follows: I am motivated to add the 
sugar to my coffee, only insofar as I believe that doing so will make the fulfilment of my intrinsic 
motivation to drink sweetened coffee more achievable. Hubin claims that it is only the fulfilment of 
these intrinsic motivations, in this case my motivation to drink the sweetened coffee, that generates 
reasons for action. Moreover, he argues that the instrumental motivations that we have are 
susceptible to being based on false beliefs in a way that intrinsic motivations are not. According to 
Hubin, it is this susceptibility to being based on false beliefs that leads to the existence of defective 
motivations for action. For example, to return to the salted coffee case, my motivation to add the 
white granular substance before me to my coffee was based on my false belief that this substance was 
sugar and not salt. Consequently, the instrumental motivation to add the white granular substance to 
the coffee was defective, but, on Hubin’s account, did not generate a reason for action and therefore 
does not pose a problem to the actual intrinsic motivation account of reasons. Indeed, this example 
seems to fit Hubin’s claim that only instrumental motivations can be defective. In Mendola’s words, 
‘Donald Hubin holds that many intuitively incorrect desires are not incorrect intrinsic desires, but 
rather incorrect instrumental desires, rooted in false beliefs about what would satisfy intrinsic desires’ 
(Mendola, 2009: 149). Hubin goes further than this characterisation of his work by Mendola to claim 
that: 
‘I believe that the same sort of response is appropriate for all of the “defects” that are supposed 
to be corrected by the idealizations demanded by hypothetical motivation theories. These can 
be understood as defects insofar as they are likely to interfere with the promotion of that which 
the agent is intrinsically motivated to bring about. But, if this is the only sense in which they are 
defects, the intrinsic motivation theory is not embarrassed by these defects, for it recommends 
actions in virtue of their connection with those states which we are intrinsically motivated to 
bring about, not in virtue of the particular “derived” motivation we may have as a result of some 
defect’ (Hubin, 1996: 45). 
Consequently, if Hubin is correct, then all defective motivations are explained as simply being 
defective instrumental motivations, which are motivations that do not by themselves generate 
reasons for action anyway. We can dismiss these defective instrumental motivations as simply being 
misplaced instrumental motivations that fail to track effective routes to the fulfilment of our intrinsic 
motivations. Therefore, the problem of defective motivations for the actual motivation account of 
reasons is ameliorated in a way that avoids appeal to idealisation. This is done by claiming that there 
simply are no defective intrinsic motivations. 
 Whether Hubin’s actual intrinsic motivation argument works as an alternative to idealisation 
accounts of reasons is an issue beyond the scope of this paper. What is important to this paper is 
whether we can extrapolate observations from his discussion of reasons to our consideration of the 
problem of Dead Sea apples for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. Indeed, his 
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work defending an actual intrinsic motivation account of reasons from the problem of defective 
motivations can serve as the basis for an alternative response to the problem of Dead Sea apples for 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. If we apply Hubin’s observations directly to 
the issue of welfare, then we end up with a restricted non-mental state actualist desire theory that 
claims that Dead Sea apples are instances of instrumental desire fulfilments, and that instrumental 
desire fulfilments do not by themselves non-instrumentally generate welfare. Call this the ‘Hubin-
inspired desire theory of welfare’. What exactly constitutes a non-instrumental desire is unclear. 
However, according to the Hubin-inspired desire theory of welfare, the fulfilment of a non-
instrumental desire can never be a Dead Sea apple. Consequently, our encounters with Dead Sea 
apples will give us some indication of the sorts of desires that are instrumental and those desires that 
are non-instrumental. For example, to return to the salted coffee case, in this scenario the Hubin-
inspired desire theory of welfare claims that my desire to consume the substance in the mug was only 
an instrumental desire to achieve some further end. What exactly the non-instrumental desire 
motivating that instrumental desire was is unclear. For example, it could be the desire for pleasure in 
general or the specific desire for sweetened coffee that constitutes the non-instrumental desire 
motivating my consumption of substance in the mug in this case. Nevertheless, despite this ambiguity, 
there is something to be said for the idea that my desire to consume the contents of the mug before 
me was not a truly non-instrumental desire. If we accept this claim, then this argument entails that 
Dead Sea apples do not exist as a problem for non-mental state actualist desire theories. 
Taking this position would be to commit to a restricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory because it entails the modest restriction that only those desires that we hold non-
instrumentally contribute to welfare when fulfilled or frustrated. This restriction is one that many 
writers take to be uncontroversial and necessary to preserve a non-mental state desire theory at all, 
whether idealised or actual. Indeed, many desire theories take it as a premise without a robust 
consideration of its viability (Carson, 2000: 72; Heathwood, 2005: 489; Hubin, 2003: 318). The reasons 
motivating the adoption of the restriction that only the fulfilment and frustration of non-
instrumentally held desires determines a person’s welfare tend not to be based on the claim that 
these desires are robust to the problems of defective desires or Dead Sea apples. Instead, this 
particular restriction is seen as necessary for other reasons. Mendola points out that the restriction 
that only the fulfilment and frustration of non-instrumentally held desires determine welfare seems 
necessary because, ‘otherwise there is the possibility of unintuitive double-counting of satisfactions 
towards well-being’ (Mendola, 2009: 149). This problem emerges because in the pursuit of non-
instrumental desire X, a person may form a series of instrumental desires, call them A, B and C, in 
order to achieve the fulfilment of X. It would seem strange that a proliferation of instrumental desires 
in this case would contribute to a person’s overall welfare, given that these desires are purely held on 
the basis of a belief that their fulfilment will help facilitate the achievement of the non-instrumentally 
desired outcome, X. Consequently, most non-mental state actualist desire theories tend to claim that 
only non-instrumental desires contribute to welfare when fulfilled or frustrated. While I am 
sympathetic to this restriction, I think that Hubin’s position can be convincingly modified so that we 
can remain agnostic on the claim that only non-instrumentally held desire fulfilments and frustrations 
determine welfare. Therefore, we can preserve an unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theory in response to the problem of Dead Sea apples. Moreover, the division between instrumental 
and non-instrumental desires is more challenging to make systematically than restricted desire 
accounts often assume. Consequently, avoiding appeal to this division may lead to a more 
conceptually frugal way to preserve the non-mental state actualist desire account in the face of the 
problem of Dead Sea apples. 
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Before we consider how we ought to modify the Hubin-inspired desire theory of welfare, we 
should first consider whether it really does adequately ameliorate the problem of Dead Sea apples for 
non-mental state actualist desire theories. I will not consider whether this account can answer all 
cases of defective desire fulfilments for non-mental state actualist theories of welfare, as we have 
already seen that the all-things-considered bad for welfare account can answer many examples of ill-
informed and irrational desire fulfilments. All that needs to be considered is whether the Hubin-
inspired theory of welfare can explain cases of Dead Sea apples through appeal to the claims that they 
are only instrumental desire fulfilments, and that instrumental desire fulfilments do not enhance 
welfare in and of themselves. How we assess the viability of these claims will be completely dependent 
on the criteria we outline for what constitutes a non-instrumental desire. While many non-mental 
state desire theories rely upon the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental desires, it 
is hard to pin down exactly how we categorise actual desires as belonging to either type. Indeed, it 
seems possible to attribute an instrumental value to the fulfilment of almost any desire: I desire the 
coffee because it brings me energy to start my day, I desire energy at the start of my day to reply to 
my emails efficiently, I desire to reply to my emails efficiently to shine at my job, I desire to shine at 
my job in order to raise my prospects of promotion, I desire a promotion to raise my salary, etc. . 
Where exactly instrumental desires end, and non-instrumental desires begin on this list is unclear, and 
without the development of a theory of categorisation there will be reasonable intuitional 
disagreement about which desires ought to count as non-instrumental and which as instrumental. 
Indeed, this teleological analysis of reasons for action seems to have motivated Aristotle to claim that 
all reasons for action point toward the single non-instrumentally valuable end of achieving eudaimonia 
(Barnes & Kenny, 2014: 1094a20-25). Conversely, the teleological analysis of what ends our desires 
point towards led to John Stuart Mill claiming that all desires are ultimately instrumental desires in 
the pursuit of the single non-instrumental desire for pleasure, whether that be our own pleasure or 
other people’s (Mill, 1993: 39). Both Aristotle and Mill use these similar arguments, based on 
reflections on the instrumental functions of common reasons and desires, to identify welfare with 
eudaimonia and hedonism respectively.  
These approaches take us far away from the non-mental state actualist desire theory of 
welfare and into the territory of other types of welfare theories. It seems then that if we consider 
instrumental desire fulfilments and frustrations to not effect welfare, then we may end up committing 
to an alternative welfare theory to non-mental state actualist desire theories. One could respond at 
this point by claiming that just because almost all desires have instrumental value, that does not mean 
that they are not held for non-instrumental reasons as well. Indeed, the observation that something 
can be both instrumentally and non-instrumentally valuable for a person goes back to at least Aristotle 
(Barnes & Kenny, 2014: 1097a30-35). Using this observation, we can claim that it is enough for 
someone to desire something for partly non-instrumental reasons in order for the fulfilment or 
frustration of that desire to count towards determining their welfare, regardless of whether that 
desire is also held for instrumental reasons as well. Nevertheless, it is unclear how we arbitrate 
between those desires that are held purely instrumentally and those that contain an element of non-
instrumental value. Consequently, we ought to be cautious when committing to the claim that only 
non-instrumental desires matter to determining welfare. In Mendola’s words, ‘It might be claimed 
that it is internal to the content of each desire itself whether something is wanted as a means or as an 
end, or both. But at least in the vast preponderance of cases this is not true in any way that I can 
introspect’ (Mendola, 2009: 149).  
While the problem of the proliferation of instrumental desires seeming to improve welfare on 
the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory ought to concern us, the claim that only the 
fulfilment and frustration of non-instrumentally held desires determine a person’s welfare is one that 
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also comes with its own set of problems. Moreover, unless we can clarify the division between 
instrumental and non-instrumentally held desires clearly, then the Hubin-inspired desire theory of 
welfare risks appearing to be an ad hoc solution to the problem of Dead Sea apples. Without giving a 
full account of what makes a desire instrumentally or non-instrumentally held, it seems unwarranted 
to dismiss cases of Dead Sea apples as simply belonging to the ill-defined category of instrumental 
desires and therefore not a problem for the extensional adequacy of our non-mental state actualist 
theory. This seems especially ad hoc if we take a liberal view of which desires count as non-
instrumental, as the more desires that we acknowledge count towards determining welfare, the more 
likely we will find difficult counterexamples in the form of Dead Sea apples emerging in the form of 
non-instrumentally held desire fulfilments. To claim that these desire fulfilments are instrumental 
because they are Dead Sea apples seems unconvincing. Far better to show that Dead Sea apples all 
happen to be instrumental desire fulfilments, and that we have other reasons aside from solving the 
problem of Dead Sea apples to adopt the claim that instrumentally held desires do not determine 
welfare. Conversely, if we take a more conservative view of which desires are held non-instrumentally 
and thus count towards determining welfare when fulfilled or frustrated, and claim that most desires 
are instrumentally held, then we risk constructing a theory of welfare that seems very alienated from 
the vast majority of desires that motivate people’s actions. Indeed, taking this position may lead us 
closer to an Aristotelean or hedonistic account of welfare than a non-mental state actualist desire 
theory. Therefore, I think it best to remain agnostic on whether we ought to adopt the restriction 
account that only non-instrumentally held desires determine welfare when fulfilled or frustrated.  
 
The composite desire theory 
Fortunately, it is possible to salvage observations from the Hubin-inspired desire theory of welfare 
without committing to a restricted desire theory. This can be done by claiming that our actual desires, 
whether instrumental or non-instrumental, are more fine-grained than is often assumed to be the 
case. If we think of desire fulfilment as being analogous to contract fulfilment, in the way that Griffin 
does, then we can draw further inspiration from this comparison about what conditions must be 
present to give rise to desire fulfilment (Griffin, 1986: 14). On a standard explanation of desire 
fulfilment, desires tend to be conceived as very basic propositions that contain little content and few 
clauses required for their fulfilment. For example, in the salted coffee case, my action of consuming 
the contents of the mug that contains the salted coffee is simply conceived of as a desire to consume 
the contents of the mug (full stop.). Yet it is possible, and indeed reasonable, to claim that desires 
often track multiple objective conditions at once when constructing the conditions required for their 
fulfilment. For example, it seems possible to claim that when someone desires X, they desire X only 
insofar as features A, B, and C are constituent parts of it. The desire itself is therefore a proposition 
with multiple constituent parts; it is in this sense fine-grained. If features A, B and C fail to be 
constituent parts of the fulfilment of X, then the fulfilment of X by itself does not non-instrumentally 
enhance welfare on our theory because the desire in its totality has not been fulfilled. In this way, 
several clauses may go together to make a proposition that is dependent on the fulfilment of all its 
constituent clauses in order to count as a desire fulfilment. Call this view the ‘composite desire theory’. 
The composite desire theory does not claim that all desires are fine-grained, but it does claim that 
desires can be fine-grained in this manner. Consequently, we can apply the composite desire theory 
to the problem of Dead Sea apples by claiming that Dead Sea apples are either completely or largely 
explained through appeal to the claim that they do not describe examples of actual desire fulfilments, 
but instead describe only fulfilments of constituent clauses of a wider proposition. By only fulfilling 
one of the clauses of a composite desire, Dead Sea apples generate the illusion of desire fulfilment to 
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our pre-theoretical intuitions, but upon reflection we can observe that these experiences do not 
describe actual desire fulfilments.  
In order to illustrate how the composite desire theory could work in practice, we can apply its 
findings to an example of a Dead Sea apple, such as the case of the salted coffee. In this case, it seems 
reasonable to claim that my desire for the coffee can be constructed as a composite desire for a cup 
of coffee. For illustrative purposes, we can claim that this composite desire includes the intuitively 
plausible clauses stipulating that the coffee contains sugar and is devoid of substances that bring me 
immediate pain. We remain agnostic on the claim about whether this is a non-instrumental or 
instrumental desire, and instead claim that it is a composite desire. Consequently, when I drink the 
coffee with salt, we can explain the Dead Sea apple as arising from the fact that I have simply not got 
what I desired, as I have not experienced the fulfilment of my desire for a coffee with sugar and devoid 
of substances that bring me immediate pain. Perhaps some of the clauses of the composite desire 
have been fulfilled, such as drinking the coffee itself. The fulfilment of this clause generates the illusion 
of a desire fulfilment, but the desire fulfilment has not occurred because the fulfilment of a composite 
desire requires that all its component parts be fulfilled. Therefore, based on the observation that 
desires contain multiple clauses, we can claim that the salted coffee case does not describe an instance 
of actual desire fulfilment at all because the necessary accompanying features stipulated in the 
desire’s formulation are not present. Therefore, in this paradigmatic Dead Sea apple case, we can 
claim that I have not actually experienced any desire fulfilment at all, only a defective simulacrum of 
my desire’s fulfilment. In cases such as these, we are of course motivated to action by a desire. But to 
say that one consumes the salted contents of the mug because they are motivated to do so by a desire, 
is not the same as saying that desire has necessarily been fulfilled when the contents of the mug is 
consumed and turns out not to contain what was expected. According to this position, many Dead Sea 
apples can be explained as not being cases desire fulfilments without the need to appeal to the 
instrumental/non-instrumental division of desires and the restriction that only the fulfilment and 
frustration of non-instrumental desires count towards determining welfare. 
There are a number of objections that can be raised to this account. I will consider three and 
sketch brief responses to them. Firstly, an objector can claim that the salted coffee case does seem to 
involve a desire to bring the mug to my lips, and that clearly that desire has been fulfilled. This objector 
can argue that while I also had a desire for a cup of sweetened coffee that was frustrated, I had other 
concurrent desires that were fulfilled through the action of consuming the contents of the mug. On 
this view, desires are not composite entities made up of multiple clauses, but rather concurrent single 
clauses, each of which is susceptible to individual fulfilment or frustration. Call this position the 
‘multiple concurrent desires’ view29. This view claims that we have multiple desires running 
concurrently about the same object or event, each of which involves simple propositions, some of 
which are fulfilled and others of which are frustrated when we encounter cases of Dead Sea apples. 
Bernard Williams highlights this seemingly common phenomenon of multiple concurrent desires when 
he writes that often we have a number desires about the same object or state of affairs. The example 
he gives of this phenomenon is that often, the desires ‘My wanting that P, my wanting to have some 
beliefs on the subject of whether P, and my wanting my beliefs to be true’ accompany each other 
(Williams, 1973: 262). His example highlights that we often have multiple desires about the same state 
of affairs and that, in his view, these desires ought to be treated as separate instead of components 
of a single integrated desire. If we apply the idea of concurrent desires to the salted coffee case, then 
we can claim that I have a series of desires in play when I drink its terrible saline contents; some of 
                                                          
29 This is not to be confused with the concurrence view discussed earlier, which states that a desire must be 
fulfilled at the same time as the desire experienced in order for welfare to be generated. 
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which are frustrated and others of which are fulfilled by that action. Therefore, if we accept the 
multiple concurrent desires view, then the problem of Dead Sea apples remains for unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theories30. 
The response to this objection is simply to double down on the composite desire theory and 
claim that, while I did have a desire to bring my mug to my lips, the desire was not to bring that mug 
and its saline contents to my lips. Instead, I held a composite desire to bring a mug that contained 
coffee with sugar and devoid of substances that bring me immediate pain to my lips. While my action 
of picking up the salted coffee and placing it to my lips was motivated by a desire, on the composite 
desire theory, that desire was frustrated and not fulfilled by the sip of salted coffee. My proposal is 
that these features ought to be considered more fine-grained components of a single composite 
desire, the fulfilment of which depends upon the fulfilment of all its constituent parts. The 
disagreement between the multiple concurrent desires account and the composite desire account 
seems to be reduced to a different set of intuitions. Nevertheless, the composite desire theory seems 
in a better place to maintain the normative adequacy of our unrestricted non-mental state actualist 
desire theory due to its ability to ameliorate the problem of Dead Sea apples. This in turn may give us 
a reason to prefer it to the multiple concurrent desires view.  Indeed, this seems to my mind to be the 
only viable alternative to a restricted desire theory or the concurrence view in response to the 
problem of Dead Sea apples for non-mental state actualist desire theories. 
The second objection that is worth considering to the composite desire theory is raised by 
Sumner and is based on some observations about the nature of our desires. Sumner argues that cases 
of Dead Sea apples are an intractable problem for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories. For Sumner, this problem emerges because the very structure of desire itself involves a 
knowledge gap on the part of the person desiring between their prospective desires and their actual 
experiential reaction to attaining subjective desire satisfaction. Sumner points out that we cannot 
truly know how we will react to a fulfilled desire until the desire itself has been fulfilled and we have 
perceived its fulfilment. Therefore, because desires are always prospective, they are bound to be 
approximations of the things that we believe that we want but which may ex ante turn out to be not 
reflective of what we want. For Sumner, the prospectivity of desire shows that desires themselves are 
not the locus of welfare generation but rather they attempt to track another quality that determines 
welfare: 
‘That mistake resulted from the gap between my ex ante expectation and my ex post 
experience. That gap exists by virtue of the prospectivity of desire: my preferences about the 
future always represent my view now of how things will go then. Because the gap exists from 
the very nature of desire, it cannot be closed merely by requiring that desires be rational or 
considered or informed’ (Sumner, 1996: 131-132) 
Sumner makes the intuitively plausible claim that because desires are prospective, full information 
about how we will feel once we experience subjective desire satisfaction is necessarily unavailable to 
us. Therefore, according to Sumner, we should expect Dead Sea apples to arise occasionally. Call this 
epistemic gap between ex ante expectation and ex post experience the ‘problem of prospectivity’ for 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. The problem of prospectivity would seem to 
undermine the composite desire theory’s solution to Dead Sea apples because it suggests that even 
                                                          
30 Indeed, not only does it remain but it seems magnified. If desires tend to be single clauses rather than 
composite entities, then inevitably we will encounter more Dead Sea apples, as some of the clauses when 
fulfilled seem completely unrelated to welfare. It is by clustering individual clauses together under the rubric 
of composite desires that we minimise or remove the possibility of this happening. 
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composite desires are necessarily prospective and therefore approximations about what we believe 
may enhance our welfare. These approximations may turn out to be Dead Sea apples upon fulfilment. 
 Sumner raises an important problem for non-mental state actualist desire theories. However, 
the problem of prospectivity need not undermine the viability of the composite desire theory’s 
response to the problem of Dead Sea apples. This is for two reasons. Firstly, an unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theory does not need to claim that desire fulfilment will necessarily 
always produce all the benefits anticipated by the person desiring. It is perfectly consistent with the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory to claim that often we have false beliefs about 
the intensity of our desires and that therefore outcomes do not produce the anticipated amount of 
welfare generation. The theory is able to claim that often we get it wrong in the degree of welfare 
generated by a composite desire’s fulfilment. Indeed, all that an unrestricted non-mental state theory 
needs to claim in order to navigate the problem of prospectivity is that some welfare is always 
generated by composite desire fulfilments. It seems intuitively plausible to suggest that this minimal 
requirement of some welfare being generated is always present in cases of genuine composite desire 
fulfilments. Therefore, to make the composite desire theory robust to the problem of prospectivity, 
we will have to claim that composite desires always track objective conditions that if brought about 
will lead to an amount, however small, of positive welfare generation occurring. In this way, the 
problem of prospectivity is reduced to one that effects only the degree to which a desire fulfilment 
enhances welfare, and not the premise that desire fulfilments always do have some positive non-
instrumental effect on welfare, even if those positive effects are outweighed by other negatives 
effects. The second reason why the problem of prospectivity is not completely devastating to the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory is found in the all-things-considered bad for 
welfare explanation of defective desires. By applying this argument, we can claim that often the 
reason why our subjective experience of desire fulfilment does not match up to our anticipation of a 
desire’s fulfilment is to do with the other desire’s that are frustrated as a consequence of our initial 
desire’s fulfilment. Therefore, the problem of prospectivity need not undermine the composite desire 
theory’s approach to explaining Dead Sea apples, providing we are willing to make these claims. 
The third problem worth considering for the composite desire theory is raised by Lauinger, 
who claims that it is simply intuitively implausible to explain all Dead Sea apples through appeal to the 
composite desire theory. In Lauinger’s words, ‘It goes too far to say that people never desire to have 
certain jobs (full stop), that people never desire to be in certain relationships (full stop), etc.’ (Lauinger, 
2011: 328). The issue he is raising here is that sometimes our desires are not full of elaborate clauses 
and are instead simply desires for states of affairs without a series of caveats specifying exactly how 
those states of affairs ought to look. The point he is raising here is somewhat diminished by his 
examples, as these examples all track quite major desire fulfilments such as taking a new job or 
entering into a new relationship. Consequently, these examples seem to not need the argumentative 
resources provided by the composite desire theory, as they can instead be explained by appeal to the 
all-things-considered bad for welfare theory. When we experience major desire fulfilments, we will 
inevitably find that they lead to a whole host of other desire fulfilments and frustrations. We can 
appeal to the aggregate desire frustration to explain cases where taking that job or entering the new 
relationship seems to be a Dead Sea apple. The all-things-considered bad for welfare argument in this 
case claims simply that, while your desire was fulfilled, its fulfilment was vastly outweighed to the 
whole host of desire frustrations that were invited into your life by its fulfilment. Therefore, if 
someone does have the desire to take that job or enter that relationship (full stop), then we do not 
need a composite desire theory to explain why it was bad for their welfare. The account becomes 
more necessary in small scale-cases of desire fulfilments when there are no further desire fulfilments 
or frustrations present to explain why the desire’s fulfilment was all-things-considered bad for welfare. 
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In the more small-scale cases, such as drinking a cup of salted coffee, the claim that the desire is 
composite and therefore not truly fulfilled seems much more plausible. This is because the desire does 
not require a great number of clauses linked to the desires fulfilment in order for us to rule out cases 
of drinking salted coffee as not describing actual desire fulfilment. Lauinger could claim at this point 
that it is possible to simply desire to drink the substance in the mug (full stop) without consideration 
for its contents and to experience a Dead Sea apple as a result. The counterclaim from the unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theorist at this point is to say, in the event that someone really held 
that desire (full stop), then its fulfilment would not have been completely devoid of welfare. We 
explain the complete absence of welfare by claiming that you never got what was desired, only a 
simulacrum of that desire. This explanation seems, to my mind at least, intuitively plausible. 
Nevertheless, I do think that Lauinger’s concern that sometimes we do just desire things (full 
stop) serves as a cautionary warning that we should not allow our account of composite desires to 
become too broad in its ability to stipulate large amounts of clauses in order for a desire to be fulfilled. 
Desires cannot contain too many clauses necessary for fulfilment, or else we would never achieve the 
fulfilment of any desires. This seems intuitively wrong. Moreover, sometimes I may not get exactly 
what I desire but I get something relevantly similar to it. In these cases, it seems that the 
approximation to my desired state of affairs is close enough for me to claim that my desire has been 
fulfilled despite it not matching exactly my ex ante expectation of what fulfilment would look like. For 
example, those who order shopping online will be familiar with situations where replacement 
shopping items arrive in place of specifically ordered items when they are out of stock. Often these 
replacement items serve to fulfil our desires just as well as the originally selected item. If we allow our 
account of composite desires to specify too many clauses necessary for the fulfilment of composite 
desires, then we will struggle to explain cases like this, where a desire is fulfilled but not in the way 
that we necessarily expected it to be. One way of explaining this situation on the composite desire 
theory is to claim that the initial desire for item X was frustrated, but that on appearance of item A, 
we immediately experienced a desire for item A that was fulfilled instantly upon its arrival. This seems 
profoundly counterintuitive to explain cases where items X and A are relevantly similar. Perhaps a 
better way of explaining these cases is to claim that my initial desire for item X was reformulated on 
appearance of item A rather than frustrated. This may be a more convincing approach if we allow such 
reformulations to reshape the clauses necessary for a composite desire’s fulfilment. If we consider 
desire fulfilments as analogous to contract fulfilments, then we can consider cases like these as 
renegotiations of the contact’s terms in response to new phenomena. Nevertheless, we have good 
reasons to be sceptical of overly specific desires, and any composite desire theory will need to limit 
the scope of just how specific the conditions for a desire’s fulfilment can be. 
 More work is required to understand exactly issues around how the components of any one 
desire are tied together in cases of composite desires. Nevertheless, the outline of this argument does 
illustrate how the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory can claim that some instances 
of Dead Sea apples fail to describe desire fulfilments at all because the outcome does not fulfil crucial 
clauses that were central to the actual desire held. Therefore, we have a robust alternative to the 
concurrence theory in order to explain many Dead Sea apples on the unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theory. This alternative does not require us to make theoretical commitments to the 
effects of past desire or posthumous desire fulfilments and frustrations on welfare. Neither does it 
require us to make theoretical commitments to whether only the fulfilment of non-instrumental 
desires enhance welfare, and indeed whether the instrumental / non-instrumental categorisation can 
be made in a satisfactory way. Instead it involves a theoretical commitment to some claims about the 
structure of our actual typical desires, which are then argued as justified through reference to the 
composite desire theory. 
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Final remarks on Dead Sea apples 
I believe that the composite desire theory can be used to explain most Dead Sea apple examples. 
Others I believe can be accounted for through the all-things-considered bad for welfare explanation. 
Nevertheless, while I think there are good reasons for adopting these approaches to explain many 
cases of Dead Sea apples, I do not believe that it is necessary or convincing to evoke this response to 
explain every example given of Dead Sea apples. Indeed, to do so would undermine some of the 
plasticity of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory, which enables us to value things 
as welfare affecting outside of our own subjective desire satisfaction. Conversely, the problem of Dead 
Sea apples rests solely on reference to the lack of a feeling of subjective desire satisfaction when we 
perceive the fulfilment of one of our actual desires. Yet, if occurrences outside of our mental states 
can nevertheless affect how well our life has gone, then it seems fair to suggest that some Dead Sea 
apples may also positively affect our welfare while failing to arouse the feeling of subjective desire 
satisfaction within us. There may be cases of Dead sea apples, where despite our immediate 
discontinuation of the desire at the moment that we subjectively perceive the desire’s fulfilment, 
there are reasons to think that the desire fulfilment may have provided some non-instrumental 
benefits to our welfare. Therefore, the third way that the non-mental state actualist desire theory can 
account for cases of Dead Sea apples is to claim that there is, even in cases like these, a degree of 
welfare is generated from fulfilment thus making them all-things-considered bad for welfare and 
unproblematic to the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. This welfare generation 
need not be tied to subjective mental states. Indeed, one of the virtues of unrestricted non-mental 
state actualist desire theories is that they can value things that do not meet the Experience 
Requirement. While it may be initially imperceptible to our pre-theoretic intuitions, I think that there 
is a good reason to believe that such cases do involve an element of non-instrumental welfare 
enhancement. Therefore, my approach involves adopting a mixture of the composite desire theory 
argument against Dead Sea apples, the all-things-considered bad for welfare account of defective 
desires, and a degree of ‘biting the bullet’ to explain those examples of Dead Sea apples that survive 
these two other arguments. While either the composite desire theory approach or the ‘biting the 
bullet’ position alone will suffice to explain these types desires, I believe that there are good reasons 
for us to distinguish between different cases where we may want to apply each explanation 
separately. This preserves the plasticity of the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory in 
allowing it to value things outside of subjective desire satisfaction as non-instrumentally welfare 
enhancing, while also allowing us to dismiss other cases, such as the salted coffee Dead Sea apple, as 
not being cases of desire fulfilment at all.  
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Chapter 4: The problem of intrinsically quirky desires 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to build upon the work of the previous two chapters by briefly surveying the 
problems presented by intrinsically ‘quirky desires’ for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories. Quirky desires are desires where it is claimed that fulfilment does not non-instrumentally 
enhance a person’s welfare. We can contrast quirky desires with defective desires, which claim that 
the fulfilment of these desires actively detracts from a person’s welfare. Defective desires are best 
understood as a subset of quirky desires, and in practice there is a lot of overlap between the two. 
The case of Dead Sea apples for example can be either defective and quirky if negative welfare is 
generated by their fulfilment or alternatively they can be simply quirky if no welfare is non-
instrumentally generated by their fulfilment. Quirky desires are another type of desire said to 
undermine the extensional adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories of 
welfare. This is because these theories claim that desire fulfilment ought to always non-instrumentally 
enhance welfare. The desires that I am considering in this chapter are labelled ‘intrinsically’ quirky 
because they are all desires that writers have found fault with due to some inherent feature they are 
said to possess or that is inherent to their acquirement. I have labelled base desires, poorly cultivated 
desires, pointless desires and artificially aroused desires as all being examples of intrinsically quirky 
desires in this discussion (Heathwood, 2005: 487). However, my labelling of them as intrinsically quirky 
rather than defective is contestable, for an objector can claim that the fulfilment of some, or indeed 
all, of these desires not only fails to non-instrumentally enhance welfare but rather actively detracts 
from welfare instead. In that case, these desires would become defective rather than simply quirky. 
Nevertheless, there is an additional benefit to grouping all these desires together under the banner of 
intrinsically quirky for the sake of this discussion, which is that they can all be answered with very 
similar arguments. 
The reason given for intrinsically quirky desires failing to non-instrumentally generate welfare 
upon fulfilment is not because they necessarily lead to a lack of subjective desire satisfaction or a 
sense of regret in the agent, but rather because there seems to be something intrinsically wrong about 
claiming that these types of desire fulfilments ought to contribute non-instrumentally to welfare, or 
at least contribute non-instrumentally to welfare to the same extent as regular desires of the same 
intensity. Moreover, this intrinsic wrongness seems to be present irrespective of whether their 
fulfilment gives rise to subjective desire satisfaction or fulfils long-standing and subjectively important 
desires to the person experiencing them. Consequently, it makes sense to treat these cases together 
because they all merit a similar response. These issues are all given a relatively fast treatment, for I 
think that adequate responses have been elaborated within the pre-existing literature on these topics. 
Overall this chapter is much briefer than the preceding chapters because it draws heavily on well-
trodden responses to solve these problems for unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. 
Nevertheless, a consideration of these problems is necessary if we are to successfully defend the claim 
that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories can maintain extensional adequacy. In this 
chapter I consider poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, base desires and artificially aroused 
desires together and claim that their existence does not undermine the unrestricted non-mental state 
actualist desire theory. I conclude that we ought to essentially ‘bite the bullet’ in claiming that all these 
types of desires do non-instrumentally enhance welfare when fulfilled and outline a set of reasons to 
ameliorate intuitions that run counter to that conclusion. 
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Intrinsically Quirky Desires 
Let us begin with a consideration of pointless desires. Pointless desires are those desires which seem 
very strange and without purpose to outside observers (Heathwood, 2005: 488). A classic example of 
a pointless desire is provided by Rawls, who outlines the case of a person who dedicates their life to 
counting blades of grass31. Carson outlines Rawls’ case in this way, ‘Rawls asks us to consider the case 
of a person who possesses the capacity to do important work in applied math, but instead prefers to 
devote himself to counting blades of grass. Some contend that this person would be better off (or 
have a better life) if he became a mathematician, even though he prefers to count blades of grass’ 
(Carson, 2000: 80). The question then arises as to whether we ought to claim that, other things being 
equal, the fulfilment of pointless desires non-instrumentally generates as much welfare as the 
fulfilment of more relatable desires would do. Most writers in the literature on unrestricted non-
mental state actualist desire theories simply answer this question in the affirmative (Keller, 2004: 31; 
Heathwood, 2005: 500; Mendola, 2009: 162). Indeed, it is a necessary commitment of unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theories that they affirm the autonomy of the individual in placing 
value on whatever they desire irrespective of any objective standards. Nevertheless, writers in this 
tradition have given additional reasons to ameliorate the intuitive concern that it is extensionally 
inadequate to claim that the fulfilment of pointless desires non-instrumentally enhances welfare to 
the same degree as non-pointless desire fulfilments. 
Mendola likens the fulfilment of pointless desires to many other much more common desires 
that people hold in order to draw support for the intuition that the degree of pointlessness does not 
affect the welfare generated by its fulfilment, ‘It seems to me anyway that drinking mud or counting 
grass blades are no more objectively worse for one than some highly revered religious practices’ 
(Mendola, 2009: 162). Heathwood takes a similar approach by claiming that the line between the 
desires that we consider pointless and those which we do not seems to be unclear, ‘We can’t say that 
piano playing, stamp collecting, and rock climbing escape pointlessness because their point is the fun 
of doing so. Counting the blades of grass and throwing the ball against the wall can have a point in 
that sense, too’ (Heathwood, 2005: 499). Consequently, it appears that generating a criterion for 
pointlessness would involve tricky theoretical commitments that may lead us to devalue some of the 
desires that we currently have, and which do not intuitively seem to be pointless. An additional reason 
why we might intuitively recoil at the idea that the pointlessness of a desire does not non-
instrumentally effect the amount of welfare generated by its fulfilment is because we often have 
instrumental reasons to avoid the fulfilment of such desires (Bruckner, 2016: 2; Heathwood, 2005: 
492; Mendola, 2009: 162). This is especially the case in some examples of pointless desires such as 
eating a bowl of gravel, which inevitably seem to be tied to the frustration of other desires – such as, 
for example, the desire not to be in pain. In this way, the intuition that the pointlessness of a desire 
devalues the amount of welfare non-instrumentally generated by its fulfilment may arise from us 
identifying good instrumental reasons for being averse to pointless desire fulfilments. However, the 
unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theorist is committed to the claim that some 
compensatory welfare is to be found even in such cases of pointless desires. In Keller’s words, ‘on the 
Unrestricted View there is, from the point of view of your welfare, something to be said for eating the 
gravel’ (Keller, 2004: 28). Another reason why we may want to revise our intuition that the fulfilment 
of pointless desires does not non-instrumentally enhance welfare to the same extent as the fulfilment 
of non-pointless desires is provided by Keller. He claims that, when we consider someone 
                                                          
31 There is not uniformity in the literature on the terminology used for these types of desires. Heathwood 
labels them pointless desires, Keller calls them ‘crazy goals’ (Keller, 2004: 30), and Griffin labels them irrational 
desires (Griffin, 1986: 25). I have opted to use Heathwood’s classificatory system. 
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endeavouring to fulfil a pointless desire, it is surely better for them that they actually fulfil that desire, 
all things being equal, than that they fail to fulfil it (Keller, 2004: 31). In this way, the good grass counter 
who endeavours successfully to accurately record grass numbers would have more welfare generated 
by this activity than the bad grass counter who hopelessly loses track of the total number of grass 
counted. If we subscribe to this intuition, then Keller thinks that we ought to assent to the idea that 
pointless desires non-instrumentally enhance welfare to the same extent as non-pointless desires 
when fulfilled. 
A final reason that we may want to revise the intuition that the fulfilment of pointless desires 
does not non-instrumentally enhance a person’s welfare, or does not non-instrumentally enhance a 
person’s welfare to the same extent as the fulfilment of a non-pointless desire of the same intensity 
does, is found in Heathwood’s position that, ‘I explain our feeling that the lives described in the 
arguments are lacking by pointing out that the lives rank low on other scales of evaluation that we 
care labour, scales different from the welfare scale’ (Heathwood, 2005: 500). Consequently, 
Heathwood claims that we intuitively recoil at the idea that pointless desire fulfilments non-
instrumentally enhance welfare to the same degree as non-pointless desire fulfilments of the same 
intensity because our intuitions are mistaking welfare value with other scales of value that are not 
enhanced by the pointless desire’s fulfilment. He points to other writers who have made a similar 
point that welfare is not the only way of evaluating an individual’s life that seems to matter 
normatively to us (Feldman, 2004: 8; Griffin, 1986: 23; Sumner, 1996: 20). We may intuitively believe 
that pointless desire fulfilments do not non-instrumentally enhance welfare to the same extent as 
non-pointless desire fulfilments because they are devoid of, for example, ethical or aesthetic value. 
Therefore, we have a host of arguments that may go some way to ameliorating the intuition that 
pointless desire fulfilments do not non-instrumentally enhance welfare to the same extent as non-
pointless desire fulfilments of the same intensity.  
These considerations can be analogously applied to the case of base desire fulfilments. These 
are desires which seem inherently immoral to fulfil. For example, the sadistic desire of taking pleasure 
in the suffering of non-consenting innocent people may be a prime example of a base desire. The 
immorality of the desire is sometimes said to undermine the amount of welfare non-instrumentally 
generated by its fulfilment. Heathwood explains the intuition that base desire fulfilments do not non-
instrumentally enhance welfare by claiming that our intuitions are tracking ethical value rather than 
welfare values in these cases, ‘The reason, I submit, that we react strongly against a life of perpetual 
indulgence in bestiality is that we care about more than just welfare. We don’t merely want ourselves 
(or those we love) to be well off; we also want (or want them) to do good things, to be good people, 
to achieve worthwhile goals’ (Heathwood, 2005: 498). This strikes me as a satisfactory argument. It is 
intuitively plausible that someone’s life could be good for them despite their life being a blight upon 
the lives of others. Indeed, this may be part of the reason why we react so intuitively strongly against 
unethical actions.  
Similar considerations also seem relevant to cases of so-called poorly cultivated desires. These 
are the desires for states of affairs that it seems we would not have had we taken more time to develop 
a sophisticated appreciation of other categorically similar states of affairs, which seem to outside 
observers to be more intrinsically valuable. For example, someone’s appreciation of terrible art or 
music may be said to be poorly cultivated if it stems partly from a lack of exposure to, and time 
considering, objectively good art and music. Once again, we can apply the argument that our intuitions 
suggest that these poorly cultivated desire fulfilments do not non-instrumentally enhance welfare to 
the same extent as well cultivated desire fulfilments because our intuitions are picking up on 
alternative scales of value, such as aesthetic value. It may be that listening to objectively terrible music 
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detracts from the total amount of aesthetic value experienced over the course of a lifetime in a way 
that listening to good music does not do. However, this has no bearing on the welfare value of the life 
according to the unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theory. Heathwood adds to this 
argument the additional intuition that well cultivated desires tend also to have the instrumental 
benefit of increasing the intensity of our desires, ‘Since the desires are going to be satisfied anyway, 
one gets more out of them, in terms of welfare, the more intense they are. My mediocre desires never 
light my fire so much, and I’m made worse off for it’ (Heathwood, 2005: 495). If Heathwood is right, 
then it may be that well cultivated desires are in general more intense than poorly cultivated desires 
and thus generate more welfare when fulfilled. Consequently, we would have instrumental reasons 
to cultivate our desires adequately.  
 The final subtype of intrinsically quirky desires that I survey in this chapter are artificially 
aroused desires. These are the desires that people have which intuitively seem to have their origin in 
problematic causes. These causes are said to instil desires within persons that they previously had no 
desire for and in a way deemed intuitively problematic. Heathwood’s example of a potential cause of 
artificially aroused desires is found in cases of advertising (Heathwood, 2005: 493-494). In this case, 
we have a whole industry designed to stimulate artificially aroused desires within the population. 
However, Heathwood argues that we ought not to be paternalistic in claiming that some desires have 
intrinsically problematic causes and therefore ought not to count as non-instrumentally enhancing of 
welfare. Instead, he appeals to the anti-paternalistic nature of desire theories in allowing individual’s 
subjective desires to determine their own conditions for welfare generation. Moreover, as with cases 
of pointless desires, it would be theoretically challenging to establish a criterion for differentiating 
between artificially aroused desires and legitimately aroused desires. Mendola goes so far as to claim 
that, ‘There is no determinate truth about what you would desire if you were suitably insulated from 
distorting social influences, because it is not objectively fixed in some prior way what is proper 
education and what is distorting influence’ (Mendola, 2009: 161). However, Heathwood does provide 
an instrumental reason that may lead us to claim artificially arouse desire fulfilments are generally not 
as beneficial to welfare as legitimately aroused desire fulfilments would be. This is because he thinks 
they are much more likely to lead to Dead Sea apples when fulfilled (Heathwood, 2009: 493).  
 I think that arguments from pointless desires, base desires, poorly cultivated desires and 
artificially aroused desires are much less damaging to the extensional adequacy than cases of Dead 
Sea apples and defective desires. Therefore, I have not granted as much of a detailed consideration to 
these problems. What I have attempted to do here is provide a selection of arguments that ameliorate 
the intuitive force of the claim that these intrinsically quirky desires undermine the extensional 
adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. These arguments essentially 
amount to ‘biting the bullet’ in accepting that these types of desires do, all things being equal, non-
instrumentally enhance welfare when fulfilled to the same degree as normal desire fulfilments do. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has considered a set of problems that have been claimed undermine the extensional 
adequacy of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. I have divided these problems 
into problems of defective desires, Dead Sea apples, and intrinsically quirky desires. What I have set 
out to do is show how unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories have the resources to 
explain these phenomenon without recourse to idealisation or restricted variations of the desire 
theory. In my first chapter, I examined the features of unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire 
theories and some of the reasons motivating their adoption. My second chapter then considered the 
problem of defective desires and showed how the all-things-considered bad for welfare argument 
could be employed to answer many of them, while also explaining how ethical and other-regarding 
actions fit into unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories. My third chapter examined the 
problem of Dead Sea apples and argued against Heathwood’s position that we ought to adopt the 
concurrence view to solve it. Instead, I argued that adopting a ‘composite desire theory’ can 
ameliorate this problem substantially and that any remaining examples of Dead Sea apples can be 
explained as involving some non-instrumental welfare enhancement despite not giving rise to 
subjective desire satisfaction. My final chapter surveyed the problem of intrinsically quirky desires and 
surveyed the wealth of pre-existing arguments against the claim that they undermine unrestricted 
non-mental state actualist desire theories. Between them these arguments have provided a set of 
reasons against thinking that unrestricted non-mental state actualist desire theories are made 
extensionally inadequate by these sorts of problematic desire fulfilments. However, that is not to say 
that there are no other problems that may prove fatal to the viability of these types of theory.  
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